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Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the development and performances of the 
Chinese stock markets and the relationship between China's stock market development 
and economic growth. In theoretical discussions, we first review some previous studies 
about the relationship between financial development and economic growth, then 
highlight the role of stock markets in economic activity, illustrate channels that have been 
identified by the theoretical research through which stock markets can influence 
economic growth, and finally summarize the previous empirical evidence. Following this, 
we focus on the development course of China's stock market, analyze its characteristics, 
and discuss the problems caused by the market's system flaws. In empirical analysis, we 
investigate actual performance of the Chinese stock markets, using the time series 
analysis techniques, and discuss particularly the relationship between the stock market 
development and economic growth. The empirical results are consistent with our 
theoretical discussions that a policy-oriented stock market is less efficient and is, to a 
certain extent, unlikely to produce a significant and positive effect on economic growth. 
Given that one of the most important barriers to the development of China's stock market 
might be administrative interference of the government, this study finally addresses some 
corrective policy changes which may exert positive influence on the future development 
of China's stock market. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background and Significance 
In a broad sense, the securities market refers to a public market for the issuing and 
trading of stocks, bonds, investment funds and other marketable securities. Since the 
market size of bonds and investment funds are relatively small- hence contributing less 
to economic growth in China - compared to that of stocks, this research will primarily 
focus on the stock market. 
China's stock market took off after the early 1990s when the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (December 1990) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (July 1991) were 
established successively. Since the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets are dominant in 
terms of the impact on China's economy, in this article, the "China's stock market" will 
refer to the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets when there is no special clarification. 
In spite of the very brief history, about 20 years, the securities market has grown at a high 
speed, with stocks as the main instrument traded in the securities market. As an emerging 
market, the stock market has been flourishing and is becoming an indispensable part of 
China's national economy. The number of companies listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen exchanges increased rapidly, from only 10 in 1990 to 1,550 at year-end 2007 
(see Figure 1 below). Market value also soared enormously; the total capitalization of the 
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Shanghai and Shenzhen markets rose from 353.1 billion RMB 1 in 1993 to 32,714.1 
billion RMB at year-end 2007 (see Figure 2 below). Stock market capitalization exceeded 
fifty percent of GDP (53.8%) for the first time in 2000 (see Figure 3 below), and China's 
stock market is the second largest in Asia after Japan ' s. 
Figure 1 
Number of listed Companies (A and B Shares} in Mainland China, 1993-2007 
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FIGURE 2 
Total Market Capitalization of China's Stock Market, 1993-2007 
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China's stock market was developed during the system transition from a central 
planning economy to a market economy and consequently assumes the characteristic of 
imposed institutional change. According to Lin ( 1989), "There are two types of 
institutional changes: induced and imposed. An induced institutional change refers to a 
modification or replacement of an existing institutional arrangement or the emergence of 
a new institutional arrangement that is voluntarily initiated, organized and executed by an 
individual or a group of individuals in response to profitable opportunities. An imposed 
change, in contrast, is introduced and executed by government orders or laws (Lin 1989: 
P.13)." 
During the development of China's stock market, the relating authorities of 
Chinese government issued a series of regulations concerning the stock market, which 
aim at regulating the market's running and developing direction. China's stock market 
has gradually become a well-known "policy-oriented market" and this kind of 
characteristic causes the stock market to have serious system flaws. Contrary to the 
government's original intention to reassure the development of China's stock market in a 
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healthy and steady direction, some of those regulations do not propel the development of 
the stock market but bring an obtrusive effect on it, leaving a series of problems to be 
addressed. 
Although China' s stock market has achieved great accomplishments in a short 
period, there are still many problems and challenges such as a number of ineffective laws 
and regulations that have begun to restrict the development and growth of the stock 
market. Since the role of the stock market has become more prominent, China's long-
term, rapid economic growth can be jeopardized unless those above problems were 
effectively handled. Hence it is of prime importance to carefully review and study the 
experiences and lessons from the development course of China's stock market, and this 
research is an attempt on this topic. 
1.2 Literature Review at Home and Abroad 
The issue of economic growth has attracted a lot of academic attention since the rise and 
development of Economics. As the modern financial system develops, the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth, especially that between stock 
market development and economic growth, has drawn increasingly worldwide attention 
of economists. Many scholars have made brilliant contributions in both theory and 
empirical studies. 
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1.2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings on the Relationship between Stock Market 
Development and Economic Growth: 
Considerable attention has been drawn over the past few decades to the relationship 
between financial intermediation and economic growth and a burgeoning literature has 
been produced. While Schumpeter ( 1911) was among the first to posit links between the 
financial and real sectors, ever since the seminal contributions of Goldsmith (1969), 
Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), a debate has been ongoing about the theoretical issue 
of whether or not the financial system is vital for economic growth. 
One line of research argues that the financial system is inconsequentially linked to 
economic growth. This vein of research argues that the financial system only plays a very 
minor role, if any, in economic growth. Robinson (1952) argues that the financial system 
does not promote but simply responds to real economic activity by suggesting that " ... 
where enterprise leads finance follows". Similarly, 1995 Nobel laureate Robert Lucas 
(1988) argues that economists frequently "badly overstress" the role of finance in 
economic growth. Moreover, Stern's (1989) survey of development economics does not 
even mention the role of the financial factors in economic development, not even in a 
section that lists "omitted topics". 
However, another prominent line of research stresses that finance plays a pivotal 
role in economic growth and development. Bagehot (1873), Schumpeter (1912), Hicks 
(1969), and Miller (1988) give conceptual descriptions of how and empirical evidences of 
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when financial development can affect economic performance. Financial development 
involves improvements in allocating capital, mobilizing savings, exerting corporate 
control, easing risk management, and providing liquidity (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). 
Subsequently, these financial functions influence savings (Pagano, 1993; Levine, 1997) 
and investment decisions (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990), and technological 
innovations (King and Levine, 1993b) and hence economic growth. According to these 
economists, a well-developed financial system is critical for long-run economic growth. 
It is quite understandable that earlier work focuses on general importance and 
broad measures of financial development without distinguishing the stock market and 
other intermediaries since stock markets are only a small part of the overall financial 
markets. Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) list four reasons why a stock market is a 
consequential financial intermediary even when equity issuance is never a large fraction 
of total sources of funds. First, by providing investors and entrepreneurs with a potential, 
liquid exit mechanism, the existence of a stock market makes investment more attractive 
and hence might increase real economic activity generally. Second, stock markets 
facilitate capital inflow - both foreign direct investment and portfolio investments - that 
are potentially vital sources of investment funds for emerging markets and transition 
economies. Third, stock market liquidity encourages both international and domestic 
resource mobilization, transferring investors' surpluses from short-term assets to the 
long-run capital market where firms have permanent use of the capital raised for risky, 
long-duration and high-return projects. Finally, a stock market provides influential 
information that improves the efficiency of financial intermediation generally. 
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In fact, over the last two decades, the increasing intermediation role of stock 
markets, deriving from the financial liberalization measures, has shifted the research 
interest from focusing on banking, the traditional intermediation channel, to focusing on 
stock market financing. The growing interest in the role of stock markets as a stimulus to 
economic growth has opened a new avenue of research into the relationship between 
stock market development and economic growth. Similarly, whether stock markets are 
merely burgeoning casinos where" ... a serious situation can develop ... when enterprise 
becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation" (Keynes 1936), or whether stock 
markets are critical for sustained economic growth is a long-debated issue. 
As one of the financial intermediaries, stock markets can influence econormc 
growth through various functions, such as: savings mobilization, liquidity, provision of 
information regarding firms, corporate control, risk management and exchange 
facilitation . It is generally recognized that by altering the quality of these functions, the 
existence of stock markets can affect the rate of economic growth. Debate arises, 
interestingly, over the sign of these effects. Some suggest that there exists a positive 
relationship between stock market development and economic growth, while others argue 
that stock market development might be negatively linked to economic growth. 
Firstly, stock markets may enhance economic growth through liquidity. Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983) point out that a prominent function of stock markets is to offer 
liquidity to individual investors. Levine (1991) takes the Diamond-Dybvig set-up, models 
the endogenous formation of equity markets and links this to a growth model. Levine 
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(1991) and Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr (1995) show that enhanced stock market 
liquidity reduces the disincentives for investing in long-gestation and high-return projects 
by reducing trading costs, since investors are allowed to buy and sell quickly, cheaply 
and confidently when they wish to alter their portfolios. The increase in liquidity leads to 
expansions in trading activity and aggregate equity capital and is expected to spur growth. 
However, it is necessary to take into account as Bencivenga and Smith (1991) argue that 
by reducing uncertainty, the increase in liquidity may reduce saving rates enough to incur 
a negative effect on economic growth. 
Secondly, stock markets can influence real economic activity by mobilizing and 
pooling savings. Greenwood and Smith (1997) suggest that large, liquid, and efficient 
stock markets may ease savings mobilization. Specifically, the existence of stock markets 
lowers the transaction costs of agglomerating capital from agents with surplus resources 
to productive units raising investment funds and overcomes the information asymmetries 
associated with making investors feel comfortable in relinquishing control of their 
savings. Better savings mobilization increases capital accumulation, improves resource 
distribution, and hence boosts technological innovations and economic growth. Moreover, 
by lowering transaction costs, stock markets can promote specialization. Saint-Paul (1992) 
points out that stock markets may have an additional growth effect by encouraging 
specialization of production. Theoretical disagreement exists, however, on the value of 
stock markets for raising capital. Mayer (1988), for instance, argues that equity issuance 
is a relatively minor source of corporate finance. 
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Thirdly, generation of information concerning potential investments and 
allocation of capital is another vehicle by which stock market development may affect 
economic growth. High information cost may prevent capital to flow to its highest valued 
use since individual investors may not have the ability to collect, process, and produce 
information associated with evaluating firms, managers, and market conditions. 
Nevertheless, stock markets undertake the costly process of researching potential 
investments for investors. Reduced information cost improves resource distribution and 
thus accelerates economic growth (Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984; Boyd and Prescott 
1986; Allen 1990; Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990; King and Levine 1993; Kashyap, 
Stein and Rajan 1998). Furthermore, stock markets may stimulate the acquisition of 
information regarding firms (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Merton 1987; Holmstrom and 
Tirole 1993). As stock markets become larger and more liquid, investors have greater 
incentives to research and monitor firms. It's easier to profit from this information before 
which becomes widely available and prices change. Opinions differ, however, on the 
importance of stock markets in enhancing information. For example, Stiglitz (1985, 1994) 
considers that stock market liquidity will not encourage incentives for expending 
resources to acquire information; conversely, an adequately functioning stock market will 
reveal information quickly through price changes and efficient public revelation will 
reduce incentives of information acquisition. 
Fourthly, in terms of monitoring firms and exerting corporate control, Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1982) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) emphasize that well-developed 
stock markets may enhance corporate governance by mitigating the principal-agent 
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problem through tying manager compensation to stock performance. In virtue of a closer 
link aligning the interests of managers and owners, managers would strive to maximize a 
firm's equity price and act in the best interest of the providers of capital. In addition, 
equity holders exert corporate control by takeover threats that may induce managers to 
maximize firm value (Laffont and Tirole 1988; Scharfstein 1988). However, theoretical 
debate exists on this issue too. Stiglitz (1985) argues that stock market development will 
not improve corporate governance significantly. Takeover threats can be impaired 
because outsiders usually have worse information about firms than do owners and hence 
are reluctant to take over firms. Furthermore, Shliefer and Vishny (1997) show that 
information asymmetries may keep diffuse shareholders from exerting corporate 
governance effectively. Finally, by easing counterproductive corporate takeovers, stock 
market development may hurt economic growth (Shliefer and Summers 1988; Morek, 
Shliefer and Vishny 1990a, 1990b). 
Last but not least, stock markets provide vehicles for trading, pooling and 
diversifying risks. Intuitively, savers do not like risk while higher-return projects tend to 
be comparatively risky. Greater risk diversification through internationally integrated 
stock markets can foster a portfolio shift towards higher-return projects, promote resource 
distribution and finally improve economic welfare (Gurley and Shaw 1955; Patrick 1966; 
Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990; Saint-Paul 1992; Devereux and Smith 1994; Obstfeld 
1994; Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997). Again, theory is unclear, however, about the effects 
of greater risk diversification on economic growth. Stock markets can influence the 
perceptions of risk. There might be less precautionary saving if risk falls. Negative 
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impacts are feasible if risk amelioration can depress savings rate and slow economic 
growth (Devereux and Smith 1994; Obstfeld 1994). 
Some theoretical contributions in China support the view that the stock market 
may promote long-run economic growth. Through the thorough analyses into the real 
problems concerning every stage of China's stock market development track, Yang Li 
and Guogang Wang (1999), Yang Li and Dexu He (1999), and Yang Li and Songqi 
Wang (2000) demonstrate that China's stock market takes effect in many aspects, such as 
the distribution of financial resources, risk pricing, the provision of liquidity, savings 
mobilization, the demarcation of the property right and risk diversification, thereby 
facilitating investment and boosting economic growth. 
Kaiguo Wang (1999) puts forward three mechanisms through which the stock 
market can improve economic performance, including the mobilization of savings for 
investment, the improvement of the efficiency of capital distribution, and the 
enhancement of the rate of national savings. Furthermore, he mentions that the 
establishment of the stock market has transformed conservative understandings of the 
public and provides them with a brand-new perspective to comprehend the concept of 
market economy, supplying valuable human resources prepared for the transition from a 
central-planning economy into a market-oriented economy. 
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1.2.2 Empirical Evidence on the Relationship between Stock Market Development 
and Economic Growth: 
Given that stock market development takes place in tandem with other aspects of the 
financial sector, earlier empirical efforts have taken a broad view of financial 
development, mainly by employing bank-based quantitative measures. Goldsmith (1969) 
is one of the pioneers to assess whether finance exerts a causal influence on growth. 
Using cross-country growth regressions, he analyzes a set of 35 countries over the period 
1860-1963 (when available) and graphically documents a positive correlation between 
financial development and economic growth. King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) improve 
Goldsmith's work by systematically controlling for other factors that affect growth and 
they construct additional measures that are more accurate proxy for the level of financial 
development. Then they relate the overall depth of the banking sector to economic 
growth in a cross-section of 77 countries from 1960 to 1989 and show that finance 
predicts growth; however, like Goldsmith, they still do not formally deal with the issue of 
causality. More recently, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) find that in a sample of 44 
developed and emerging markets from 1986 to 1993, countries with well-developed stock 
markets tend to have well-functioning banks and other financial intermediaries as well, 
and vice versa. Also, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), utilizing firm level studies 
for 30 industrial and developing countries covering the time span from 1980 to 1991, 
argue that there are complementarities between banks and stock markets in developing 
countries. Boyd and Smith (1996) further comment that as an economy develops, the 
13 
debt-equity ratio tends to rise, with firms' two financing choices being complementary. 
Moreover, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Arestis and Demetriades (1997), using 
measures of financial activity, report mixed causal findings, especially for developing 
economies. Bell and Rousseau (200 1) utilize the detailed country case-studies for India 
and point out that the financial sector has been instrumental in improving economic 
growth. 
Recent empirical research allows for a separate role for stock market development 
in economic growth. Levine and Zervos (1998), after examining a sample of 42 countries 
over the period 1976-1993, demonstrate that numerous measures of stock market 
development are positively and significantly correlated with measures of real economic 
activity. And they conclude that there is no tension between bank-based and market-
based systems 2 (both enter the growth regression significantly), since stock markets 
provide different financial services from banks. Similarly, Atje and Jovanovic (1993) 
construct a cross-country panel of 40 countries from 1980 to 1988 and report that the 
value of stock market trading relative to GDP has a significant influence on economic 
growth after controlling for lagged investment, while bank credit does not. However, 
Harris (1997) argues that the relationship between stock market development and 
economic growth is at best very weak. Reestimating the same model for 49 countries 
from 1980 to 1991, but substituting current investment for lagged one and utilizing two-
stage least squares method, he supports the view that the stock market variable does not 
seem to affect economic growth in the full sample (which includes both developed and 
2 It is similar with the view of Demirglic-Kunt and Levine (1996a, 1996b) that there is no distinction 
between bank-based and market-based financial systems. 
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developing countries) and of the subsample of less-developed economies; meanwhile, in 
terms of the subsample of developed countries, the level of stock market activity does 
have some explanatory power but its statistical significance is pretty weak. 
A large body of empirical research referring to the case of China reveals the 
conclusion that, up to date, China's stock market development is not that strongly 
positively linked to economic growth. Performing the linear regression analysis through 
ordinary least squares method with the relevant data over the period 1994-1998, Ruyong 
Tan (1999) finds that in China the nexus between financial intermediation and economic 
growth is significant and positively related, but the effect of stock market development on 
economic growth is limited. Similarly, using the AK Model and two-stage least squares 
regression analysis, Jun Wang (2002) explores the relationship between China's capital 
market development and economic growth; he finds that there exists no obvious 
correlation. He further concludes that China's capital market has only very weak effect 
on economic growth and is negatively linked to economic growth. 
1.3 Research Methods and Outline of the Project 
1.3.1 Research Methods 
A broad-brush picture of the relationship between stock market development and 
economic growth has been recognized mainly through cross-country growth regressions. 
While the level of stock market development has been found to explain part of the 
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variation of growth rates across countries and seems to be a good predictor of economic 
growth, researchers have not reached an agreement on the issue of causality nor do they 
settle the argument on the endogeneity of the variables used in the analysis (King and 
Levine 1993a, 1993b; Levine and Zervos 1998). In addition, the relationship between 
stock market development and economic growth may reasonably be expected to vary 
considerably across countries, depending on their different institutional characteristics, 
market size and circumstances. Finally, cross-section studies are criticized3 and those 
results derived from cross-country growth regressions are suggested to be viewed with 
some caution (Levine and Renelt 1992; Arestis and Demetriades 1997; Luintel and Khan 
1999; Bell and Rousseau 2001). Contrary to cross-country studies, time series methods 
have important econometric advantages in examining the effect of stock market 
development on economic growth. Being less likely to suffer the limitations of cross-
country growth regressions, time series approaches can account for the specificity of 
individual country and are better able to address the issue of causality, since each country 
may has its own causality pattern and unique evolution path over time (Rousseau and 
Wachtel 1998). 
In this research, besides theoretically qualitative analyses, we also conduct 
empirical analyses to investigate actual performance of the Chinese stock markets, and 
particularly we will investigate the relationship between China's stock market 
development and macroeconomic growth. Since most macroeconomic time series 
variables are generally non-stationary so as to make conventional hypothesis-testing 
3 The widespread skepticism derives from the facts that cross-section studies are based on a fragile 
statistical basis and that the results do not adequately account for the variation across countries with 
different institutional, legal and political settings. 
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procedures based on the t, F , and z 2 test statistic unreliable, it is not appropriate to 
apply the conventional regression techniques to investigate their relationships. In order to 
avoid the possibility of spurious results, our empirical investigation is conducted within 
the framework of testing for unit roots and testing for co-integration in macroeconomic 
time series, which started gaining popularity in the early 1980's. 
1.3.2 Outline of the Project 
Based on such backgrounds, the rest of the paper is structured as follows . In Chapter Two, 
I will briefly present the development process of China's stock market, analyze its 
characteristics, and reveal the problems caused by the deficiencies of China's stock 
market system. In Chapter Three, I will use the time series technique to analyze the 
mechanism of the relationship between performances of the Shanghai stock market and 
the Shenzhen stock market, that between performance of the individual sector and the 
whole market, and most importantly, that between stock market development and 
economic growth and the scale of their mutual influence. After identifying and analyzing 
the barriers to the development of China's stock market, in Chapter Four, I will suggest 
some corrective policy changes. Finally I will summarize this research project and 
provide some concluding remarks in the last chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S STOCK MARKET 
2.1 Background 
In 1978 the Chinese Communist Party held the Third Session of the Eleventh Central 
Committee of the Party, which established the far-reaching reform and "Open Door" 
policy4 and laid the foundation for the creation and survival of a modern stock market. 
The economic reforms were designed to strengthen China' s economy by transforming the 
traditional highly-centralized planning economy (1952-1978) into a market-oriented 
economy. However, the period of economic expansion induced by the economic reforms 
was dampened by many critical obstacles, such as the scarceness of capital supply and 
the inefficient operation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). At that time, the 
establishment of the stock market has emerged as one of many novel phenomena in 
China's economy that collectively motivated China to implement a new round of 
economic reforms. China's stock market plays a role more than a mere financial 
intermediary; it represents a move away from the central-planning economy to the 
application of the market mechanism for the distribution of financial resources. There is 
no denying that the development of the stock market was inextricably linked to the 
changing socio-economic context and the context can be broadly summarized as a 
combination of the following four conditions: 
4 In 1978 Deng Xiaoping launched China on an original path to socialism with "Chinese characteristics". 
Deng's Open Door policy included both economic and cultural aspects, but both represented a new 
"openness" . On the economic side, free markets were encouraged at the lower levels of the Chinese 
economy O while in the cultural domain D China became a more engaged partner in the international 
exchange of ideas. 
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First, the establishment of a stock market provides channels for industrial 
restructuring in China. In the early 1980s, the Chinese government has already realized 
the significance of making efforts to push forward industrial restructuring and upgrading 
across the board, an influential strategic plan to boost economic development. However, 
at the threshold of a market economy, China did not have well enough basic 
infrastructures, not to mention a well-developed financial system to effectively mobilize 
and distribute resources. Some suggest that this object could be achieved by remolding 
widely scattered firms into a few gigantic corporate groups. Unfortunately there are two 
difficulties to adopt this method: one difficulty comes from the challenge that it's hard for 
firms from different departments to be smoothly restructured into gigantic conglomerates 
due to many real difficulties; another reason is that corporate groups can be better 
accomplished naturally following economic interests instead of succumbing to 
administrative pressure. The development of the stock market can relatively overcome 
these two difficulties and support the implementation of a large-scale industrial 
restructuring and rejuvenation program by mobilizing capital flow and by distributing 
capital to the highest valued use in the economic system. 
Second, there is an urgent demand to develop a stock market in order to propel 
China's State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) reforms. One important defect of the previously 
central-planning economy system was the over-control and over-regulation on the SOEs. 
The policy burdens on the SOEs gradually resulted in many negative consequences on 
the SOEs, such as the soft budget constraints, the unclear line between the functions of 
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the government and enterprises, the problems regarding property right, the incentive 
problems and the enterprises' lack of viabilities. China's SOE reforms commenced from 
the reform of the incentive mechanisms of the SOEs and later gradually transited to the 
reform of the ownership structures of the SOEs. China's stock market has assumed a 
particularly pivotal role in the SOE reforms since its rapid growth in the early 1990s; and 
it helps to propel the course of the SOE reforms by two ways. On one hand, the existence 
of the stock market expands the financing channels available to enterprises and thus 
relieves the government's financial burden of sustaining small- and medium-sized SOEs 
which are strategically unimportant. On the other hand, by changing entrepreneurs' 
ownership structure and internal governance structure, it can encourage the SOEs to 
improve their management and efficiency in fund use through exerting supervision from 
the shareholders, thereby successfully transforming them into market players. 
Third, general enterprises faced financing problems caused by a weak financing 
system, providing the motivation to establish a stock market. During the period of the 
central-planning economy, the financing system in China was dominated by fiscal 
financing, along with a limited amount of bank financing in order to meet short-term cash 
flow. Funds were distributed according to "unified revenue and unified expenditure" 
system and were served mainly for the investment needs of SOEs. However, the 
inefficient operation led to numbers of loss-making SOEs and a decrease in revenue. 
Many SOEs were merely sustained by the loans from the state banks. Over the period 
from 1958 to 1978, Fiscal Avenue averaged out at 37.2 percent of total national income; 
during the same period, 84 percent of the funds needed for capital investment by state-
20 
owned enterprises were provided from the national budget, in most cases requiring no 
repayment (Wang 1999). It is reported that four state-owned commercial banks officially 
had non-performing loans (NPLs) worth 30 percent of their total loan portfolios at year-
end 2001 as a result (Green 2004). However, this old restricted financing system cannot 
satisfy the increasing huge fund demand deriving from a newly market-oriented economy. 
The establishment of China's stock market breaks down the long-standing financing 
system which relies on the government and the state-owned banks, provides a public 
function to mobilize the idle capital in the economy, and efficiently distributes them to 
the production sectors that need them. In this way, entrepreneurs can solve their financial 
difficulties by raising funds directly from the stock market. Since then, the formation and 
expansion of enterprise capital has increasingly come to depend on capital markets, 
particularly on the stock market. A diversified financial system came into existence. 
Fourth, for potential investors, a stock market provides a legitimate investment 
channel for enterprises' and individuals' surplus funds. Ever since 1978, the 
establishment of the "Open Door" policy has ceased the practices during the period of the 
central-planning economy that all enterprises' should turn in their surplus funds to the 
government and that forbid salary gap among residents to realize salary equalization. 
Especially after the implementation of the household responsibility system in 1979, the 
agricultural economy was revitalized and hence farmers' income increased. The surplus 
funds available to local governments, enterprises and residents rose, creating a pressing 
need for investment channels. As a result, a new financial intermediary -a stock market-
came into being. From a micro perspective, the existence of the stock market provides a 
21 
channel to realize the preservation and appreciation of capital value; from a macro 
perspective, it promotes the socio-economic development by mobilizing savings and 
distributing social capital. 
2.2 Brief History of the Development of China's Stock Market 
China's authority once closed all stock exchanges and securities companies due to 
political issues. Until December 1978, China initiated the economic reforms in an attempt 
to establish a market-oriented economy. The implementation of the economic reforms 
involves many major measures, including: establishing special economic zones in the 
coastal areas, supplying favorable environments for foreign investment, permitting the 
issue of securities, allowing SOEs to experiment in the shareholding system, and so forth. 
The reform policies cater for the needs of enterprises' increasing fund demand in a newly 
market-oriented economy. In September 1984, Beijing Tianqiao Department Store 
Company, the first shareholding enterprise, was established in Beijing by the issue of the 
three-year maturity equities. In November of the same year, Feile Acoustics Company 
launched an offer of five hundred thousand RMB nonredeemable equities to the public in 
Shanghai. After the initial practices of shareholding enterprises (SHEs), many SOEs (in 
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Shenyang, and Wuhan) followed and 
the trend swept over all the major cities in China. Consequently, the scattered, 
rudimentary stock issuance market has begun to take shape. 
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On China's case, since the securities was not the outcome of an advanced market 
mechanism but more like a result of government's policy intervention, it's not surprising 
to find that the existence of securities was not accompanied by a secondary market. This 
is coincident with the truth that the original objective of the Chinese government in 
permitting the issue of securities was to broaden financing channels, and to improve the 
operational efficiency of the SOEs, instead of establishing a trading market for the 
securities holders. However, having experienced black-market trading and over-the-
counter (OTC) transactions, it turns out that a primary market cannot exist and operate 
soundly unless there is a secondary market. In September 1986, the Shanghai Branch of 
the People's Bank of China (PBC) determined to allow security transfers on a public 
basis and authorized the Shanghai Trust and Investment Company to act as an 
intermediate agency for buying and selling securities. The first Chinese OTC market was 
established then and this marked the beginning of official securities trading activity in 
China. The official re-establishment of the stock market in China was marked by the 
opening of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the early 
1990s. Thereafter China's stock market has entered a new era and has been enjoying a 
rapid development. In July 1992, Huaxia, Guotai and Nanfan, the three largest securities 
companies in China, were established successively. 
China's stock market shows features that differ significantly from those of 
modern-style stock markets owing to the fact that it emerged and has been growing as a 
hybrid with central-planning and market-oriented components. The most pronounced 
feature of China's stock market is the complicated split share structure of stocks. Initially, 
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the stocks listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges were only issued to the 
Chinese residents. Since year-end 1991, China's authority permitted a number of firms to 
issue stocks to foreign investors for the purpose of favoring foreign investment. China's 
stocks are classified by accessibility into A shares, B shares, H shares, and N shares. A 
shares (quoted in RMB, available only to domestic investors) and B shares (quoted in 
foreign currencies, available only to overseas investors before 2001) are listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges and are available for mainland China residents5. 
H shares and N shares are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and other foreign 
stock exchanges and are available for foreign investors6. The complicated structure of 
China's stocks is reflected not only by the evidence that the trading markets for the four 
types of share are distinct and separate, but also by the variety of ownership. At that time 
no one would want to take the responsibility for causing the loss of state assets since 
private ownership and privatization was political taboo. Consequently, the ownership of 
equity in a same company has been artificially divided into state-owned shares7, legal 
person shares8, internal person (employee) shares, and social public shares. Among them, 
social public shares are the sole marketable shares on the exchanges in Shanghai or 
Shenzhen, and only a few legal person shares have been allowed to transfer ownership 
between legal persons through the State Trading Automatic Quoting (STAQ) system and 
the National Electronic Trading (NET) system9; while the remaining shares are all non-
5 In the past, only foreigners were allowed to trade B shares. Starting from February 2001, mainlanders 
with legal foreign currency accounts can trade B shares as well. 
6 Due to the reason above, B shares are also issued to foreign investors. 
7 State-owned shares refer to the shares converted from state-owned assets when the SOEs undertook 
shareholding reforms. 
8 Legal person shares are the shares converted from the assets of institutions or enterprises, which joined 
the shareholding companies before they were listed. 
9 The Chinese government authorized the connection of the STAQ system in Beijing in 1992 and the NET 
system in Beijing in 1993 in order to satisfy the trading needs of legal person investors. 
24 
negotiable, including the state-owned shares that account for the dominant proportion of 
overall shares. This results in an unreasonable equity structure and severe non-liquidity. 
During the period of almost two decades, the development course of China's 
stock market can be generally classified into four phases: 
The first phase is the symbolic and pilot phase of China's stock market from 1990 
to 1997. At that time, the early development of China's stock market can be liken to steps 
into the dark. The regulatory mechanism of the stock market just began to take shape and 
imposed price limits and quantity restriction on trade. China's stock market saw the first 
great bull market in May 1996. Given the immature regulatory mechanism, a great 
number of problems had arisen accompanying the high speed development of the stock 
market, such as the black market. The following macro-control policy naturally focused 
on how to suppress the stock market. 
The second phase is from 1997 to 2001 and the stock market is put into real use. It 
was first put forward constitutionally in the Fifteenth National Congress that 
shareholding system should become the main form of public ownership system, 
establishing the stock market firmly. China's stock market started to increase rapidly 
again from 1999 to 2001. However, a number of problems remained to be solved: the 
more severe divergence of stock price and economic performance, the price/earnings 
ratio stayed stubbornly high and constant disclosure of illegal behaviors. Furthermore, the 
function of the stock market is defined as "revitalizing state-owned enterprises" although 
most of SOEs are loss-making ones. 
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The third phase is the transitional period of China's stock market and lasts from 
2001 to 2005. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) began to get down 
to improving the regulatory system. But this effort did not achieve the desired results 
since the problem of the split share structure remained unsettled. During this phase, the 
stock value was much underestimated and even fell below par. The stock market did not 
exert its basic function for financing, not to mention for optimizing distribution of 
resources. 
The fourth phase originates from the Split Share Structure Reform in May 2005 
till now, with the purpose of solving the institutional bottlenecks constraining the 
development of the stock market. China's stock market had made significant progress in 
institutional construction in recent years. Initiated by the Split Share Structure Reform, 
the fundamental institutional defects of China's stock market for 15 years have been 
touched and the era of full circulation is being expected to arrive. The implementation of 
the new Securities Law is another important demonstration that the development of 
China's stock market has entered a new era. Meanwhile, there had been major advances 
in other aspects as well, including: the improvement in comprehensive management on 
securities companies, the enhancement of the quality of listed companies, and the 
increase in institutional investors. These achievements become the institutional 
foundation for the transitional stage of China's stock market. Given the successful 
completion of the reform, the stock market saw the greatest bull market ever since the 
establishment of China's stock market. Although currently the Shanghai stock exchange 
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(SSE) composite index was lower than the highest value of 6124.04 in 2007, the long-
term development of China's stock market is generally favorably reviewed. 
2.3 Government Macro-control Policy and Development Characteristics of the Stock 
Market ("Policy-Oriented Market") 
The establishment of China's stock market and the reform of its operating environment 
have been both implemented on a gradual basis. Gradual reform has the advantage of 
making it easier for entrepreneurs and households to adjust their behaviors to achieve 
improvement gradually. Yet the corresponding guideline "incremental reform" that 
directed the development of the stock market has incurred a lack of sound, far-sighted 
development plans. Originally the construction of China's stock market can be 
characterized as an incentive-based evolution system. After the launching of exchanges in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990s, especially after the establishment of the State Council 
Securities Committee and the CSRC in 1992, the stock market has gradually moved 
towards the government-led evolution path. Namely, China's stock market did not 
develop voluntarily and naturally in the way that it did in the developed countries; instead, 
its development was arranged by the Chinese government and the methods by which 
stocks are listed and shares issued in China's stock market apparently violated the market 
principle. The government has become one of the super beneficiaries that take priority 
over all other market participants. Hence there was an inevitable trend that the 
government and the related parties that shared common interest with the government 
would organize a special interest group. This interest-biased system eventually led to the 
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government's overall intervention and China's stock market gradually became the so-
called "policy-oriented market". 
Generally speaking, the government's policy intervention in the stock market 
includes monetary policy, fiscal policy and stock market policy. The government can use 
monetary policy to affect share prices through changes in money supply and in market 
interest rates. Fiscal policy can also exert an influence on stock prices through 
adjustments in state budget, tax revenue and national debt. However, besides indirect 
adjusting means, namely monetary policy and fiscal policy, stock market policy is 
regularly employed by the Chinese government to directly control the stock market as 
well and the control measures are as follows: 
(1) Government's Policy Intervention in the Chinese Stock Issuance Market 
A. Pei'ezhi (the quota system, 1997)- Hezhunzhi (the sanction system, 2001) 
Under a strict planned management system, the volume management of stock 
issuance was incorporated into the national credit plan and monetary policy right from 
the start. In 1997, the CSRC promulgated new regulations governing the issue of new 
shares, with the implementation of the Pei'ezhi (the quota system). The adoption of the 
quota system resulted in administrative options when screening listing qualification, 
which make nearly all the listed companies were the SOEs with pervasive poor 
performances. And then serious problems emerged such as "rent-seeking", "adverse 
selection" in the process of going public applications, and "reversed transmission of the 
pressure for easing monetary condition" when many local governments intend to satisfy 
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their expanding financing requirements. The original stock issue system, Pei'ezhi, was 
substituted by the Hezhunzhi 10 (the sanction system, or the stock issue approval system) 
on 17 March 2001 after the Security Law was published in 1999. There is no denying that 
under the Hezhunzhi, the number of non-state listed companies increased sharply and the 
average performance of the listed companies improved as well. However, listed non-state 
enterprises only account for 7%, while the majority of listed companies in China are still 
SOEs; this phenomenon is understandable since the government's original policy target 
of setting up the stock market is to support the SOE reforms. To sum up, although been 
modified, Hezhunzhi still has the government guiding characteristic; accordingly, the 
competition among listed companies is limited. 
B. Listed companies' incremental issuing and follow-up financing are also been 
regulated. 
The characteristic of government's policy intervention is also been reflected by 
the evidence that listed enterprises' incremental issuing and follow-up financing are been 
regulated by the government. Generally, the initial public offering cannot satisfy the 
subsequent financing needs of most of listed Chinese companies on account of the vast 
majority of non-tradable shares, so the companies after listing will seek for the 
opportunities to manage follow-up financing by issuing additional equity offer, share 
allotment, convertible bond and so forth. Although the government regulated this 
behavior by setting up concrete share ratios and performance indexes, at that time under 
the circumstances without intermediaries of high integrity, serious problem still existed 
10 Under the new method, the enterprise applicant should be first reviewed by security companies, then the 
qualified candidates will be recommended to the CSRC, and only after their application were sanctioned by 
the CSRC could they go public. 
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because the listed enterprises can win the approval of the authority by submitting falsified 
financial statements. 
(2) Government's Policy Intervention m Merger & Acquisition (M&A) and 
Restructuring in China's Stock Market 
A. Local government authorities compete for control of listed companies. 
In China, given that the enterprises initially listed were all local companies, there 
is no doubt that the stock market primarily benefited the local economy in the first place. 
However, the authorities, especially local government authorities, have gradually begun 
to meddle in the M&A and restructuring affairs on the stock market in order to compete 
for control of listed companies. The M&A and restructuring measures are supposed to 
serve for the purposes of helping enterprises to expand the scale, to enlarge the market 
share, and to improve the operational efficiency. Owing to numerous administrative 
controls exerted by local governments, the M&A and restructuring activities can no 
longer provide a normal self-repair mechanism that is indispensable to the development 
of a well-functioning stock market. As a consequence, many hostile takeovers appeared 
with the intention of occupying the resources of listed companies or of tunneling listed 
companies through the M&A and restructuring. 
B. The real objectives of most shareholders of current listed companies pursuing 
restructuring are to secure their listing and to maintain the means for further 
misappropriating. 
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It's quite confusing that most of companies in China's stock market tend to 
manifest worse operational performance after listing. The puzzle can be partly explained 
by the fact that enterprises tend to submit inflated figures in the financial statements for 
the purpose of implementing the initial public offering and of securing listing. Normally, 
the listing system should be recognized as an efficient mechanism that can direct 
financial recourses to its highest valued use. However, the listing qualification has 
gradually been seen as a measure of getting access to the right of appropriating financial 
resources without debt service payment. Under the defective quota system, local 
governments managed to engage in a wide variety of public relations (PR) activities in 
order to secure their own share of the quota. It has been reported that, for every 100 RMB 
worth of shares listed, 0.34 RMB - 0.98 RMB is spent on PR for each enterprise on the 
average. Such large amounts of PR expenditure not only represent a waste of resources, 
but also lead to an increase in power for money transactions and abundant cases of 
corruption by using falsified financial statements and prospectuses to secure listing. 
C. The government has a partiality for listed companies and has not provided 
enough legal protection for investors. 
Since lots of listed companies had been supported by local governments and even 
top government institutions, the boundary between securities business and supervisory 
sectors was quite confusing. Although many listed companies were involved in frequent 
scandals and illegal transactions, it is not surprising to find that the authorities mainly 
favor the interests of listed companies and thus have not provided enough legal protection 
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for investors. The problem is borne out by the truth that the Special Treatment (ST) 11 
system and the Particular Transfer (PT) 12 system lasted for more than ten years. Even up 
to date, the government policies regulating the delisting mechanism are not good enough, 
for example: the OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB) still provides a safe haven for listed 
firms which face delisting. It is argued that these earnings-based delisting requirements 
are misconstrued. Such policies drive financially healthy firms out of the stock market, 
and induce listed firms to engage in rampant earnings manipulation in order to avoid 
delisting. Furthermore, another proof of the government's partiality on listed companies 
is that the authority tends to treat illegal behaviors with harsh blame but with light 
penalties. The famous scandal of Zheng Bai Wen 13 has not only devastated many 
investors, but also broke the market order, impaired credit worthiness of listed firms and 
images of governments, and shook public confidence in China's stock market. These 
phenomena carry prominent policy implications for stock market regulation: a powerful 
securities appraisal institution should be established, together with the formation of a 
securities rating system and the division of shares into different classes, to ensure that the 
investors' rights are sufficiently protected. 
11 Since April 1998, in China's stock market, firms reporting two consecutive annual losses are subject to 
special treatment. The special treatment means that the stocks are traded with a 5% price change limit each 
day vs. I 0% for normal stocks. And its midterm reports must be audited. 
12 Since July 1999, an ST firm that continues to suffer further loss for one more year will be designated a 
PT firm . PT stocks can only be traded on Friday, with a maximum 5% upside limit to last Friday's close, 
but no restriction on the downside. lfPT firms cannot become profitable, this will cause the firms' stocks to 
be suspended from trading or to be delisted. 
13 The scandal of Zheng Bai Wen refers to the incident that the original shareholders of the enterprise 
Zheng Bai Wen were deprived of half of their stock rights but could not win the lawsuit due to the 
government's biased intervention. 
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(3) Government's Policy Intervention in Chinese Securities Companies' Senior 
Executives and Their Behaviors 
In China, since the establishment of each security firm has been examined and 
approved by the regulatory authority, along with its senior executives mainly appointed 
by the government, many problems arise. On one hand, the governmental appointment 
scheme is detrimental to the development of a sound corporate governance system 
because those executives tend to display non-company performance value orientation and 
opportunistic behaviors. The widespread breach of the law precisely uncovers the 
deficiency of the corporate governance system in Chinese listed firms. Most of scandals 
on the stock market are associated with problems of corporate control, such as: non-
disclosure, misleading financial statements, insider trading, market manipulation and so 
forth. On the other hand, the governmental examination and approval system leads to the 
underperformance of the supervisory sectors in listed firms. The close relationship 
between securities companies and the regulatory authorities blurs the boundary between 
business and supervisory organs. Hence, in many cases, the supervisory authorities turned 
a blind eye to insider trading and market manipulative activities conducted by executive 
directors and officers, or even failed to notice the irregularities in the securities 
companies. 
(4) Other Government's Policy Intervention in China's Stock Market 
It is difficult to list every aspect of the government's policy intervention in 
China's stock market. Moderate regulations cannot be blamed in terms of reducing 
market risk, but what matters most is the real objective of the government, to be specific, 
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who is the largest beneficiary for whom the government makes efforts to prevent and 
mitigate financial risks. Regulatory policy has often been used as a vehicle to clear up the 
accumulated structural problems after a period of development. For instance, China faced 
the need to undertake a clear-up following the major expansion of the stock market that 
has occurred since 1996; thereby the government placed restrictions on listed companies' 
illicit funds and illicit operation. Specifically, in 2001 the government resolutely 
investigated and banned the illicit flow of bank funds, mainly state-owned bank funds, 
into the stock market, regardless of the consequent continuous fall of market prices. The 
resolved practice stems from the fact that most of illicit funds belong to state-owned 
banks and hence state-owned banks cannot bear all the costs for themselves in the end. It 
turns out that the government is the ultimate interest subject in the stock market. 
2.4 Problems Caused by the Deficiencies of China's Stock Market System 
The overall government's policy intervention in the stock market brought about the 
inefficient supervision system designed to regulate the market, in other words, the market 
operation deviated from the government's intention. Those regulations led to many 
distortions in the stock market, such as imperfect market structure and market 
malfunctions. 
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(1) Distortions of Chinese Listed Companies' Property Rights System and Corporate 
Governance Structure 
Contemporary institutional economics considers the property rights system and 
the corporate governance structure as the foundation of economic efficiency. In fact, one 
of the government's intentions to establish the stock market is to diversify property rights 
and to realize the separation of ownership and management, thereby furthering the 
establishment of a modern enterprise system. However, the government's intention fell 
through owing to its own strict regulatory controls on the stock issuance and the M&A 
and restructuring. Considering that many problems existed such as adverse choice, rent-
seeking, and securities fraud, the property rights system and the corporate governance 
structure did not get advanced, or even became worse. On China's case, the concrete 
features of the distortion are that: some stockholders have held the overwhelming 
percentage of overall shares in Chinese listed companies; the problem of differentiated 
types of shares results in the abnormal phenomenon that the same shares can be traded 
with different price, be repaid with different interests and enjoy different rights; the stock 
markets with A shares, B shares, H shares and N shares are actually segmented; given 
that most of securities companies' senior executives were appointed by the government, 
the problem of insider control has also not yet been solved fundamentally. These defects 
all stem from the government's policy intervention, since excessive regulations distort the 
enterprises' objective of profit maximization and convert it to administrative objective, or 
even to personal goal, leading to the malfunction of the stock market's resource 
distribution effect and the loss of investor's rights. Therefore, if the situation of listed 
companies' ownership concentration and corporate governance structure cannot be 
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improved in the long term, the imbalance between corporate quality and the expansion of 
the stock market will become even greater. 
(2) Time-Lag and Instability of the Laws and Regulations in the Stock Market 
The Chinese government is confined by its ideology and interest when it enacts 
and enforces the laws and regulations; accordingly, these laws and regulations always 
tend to be lagged and unstable, along with ambiguous interest guidelines. The 
development history of China's stock market is quite convoluted: first came the self 
issuance, the autonomous transaction second; the OTC trading preceded the nation-wide 
integrated market; the local government authorities conducted the regulatory constraints 
and supervision ahead of the unified national regulatory body; the code administrations 
with too many departments came first and then the unified laws followed. For example, 
in the initial years, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges formulated market 
regulations independently without a uniform benchmark and hence had significantly 
different regulations in the rules of company listing, routine operation, microstructure and 
so forth (Rajen and Yu, 1995). The complexity referring to the case of China is 
determined by the overall planning called "incremental reform" that leads to the lagged 
recognition and operation of the government regarding the enactment and performance of 
the laws and regulations. In conclusion, the laws and regulations in the stock market were 
vacant, misplaced or "offside", thus causing the dissimilation of market participants and 
market functions. In consequence, rent-seeking, adverse choice, moral hazard, 
corruptions and other negative phenomena began to exist in everywhere from various 
components in the stock market to individual participant. For instance, the government's 
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initiative of the Split Share Structure Reform incurred the long-run bear market from 
200 1 to 2005. 
(3) Simplistic Structure and Distorted Functions of China's Securities Market 
The inconsistent and constantly changing laws and regulations led to the 
simplistic structure and insufficient, distorted functions of China's securities market. The 
simplistic structure mainly covers two aspects. First, the securities market has simplistic 
variety structure, because the government's strict controls imposed on bond issuing and 
trading lead to the consequence that, under the same conditions, enterprises are inclined 
to issue stocks instead of bonds, given the lower costs of stock issuance during the 
contemporary regulatory system. Second, the simplistic market structure of the securities 
market is evidenced by several facts: first, many once existed local property right 
exchanges and the ST AQ system were all cancelled; second, the plan of establishing a 
start-up board had been conceived many years, but eventually the board was renamed the 
second board and became part of the Shenzhen exchange system, showing no major 
differences compared to the main board market; moreover, the third market serving for 
delisting is limited by the trading procedures and the exchange hour; in addition, the 
transaction outside stock exchange is forbidden so far. By apparently confining the 
possibility of securities issuance and the liquidity of transactions, the simplistic location 
structure and variety structure are both impediments to the distribution of financial 
resources on a deeper level and a larger scale. 
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(4) China's Stock Market Lacks Effective Competition, Constraints and Motivation 
Mechanisms 
Undoubtedly China's stock market cannot function effectively without proper 
competition, constraints and motivation mechanisms. 
A. The market does not have a fully competitive mechanism. 
In the Chinese market for the transaction of corporate control rights, most of the 
transactions are administrative arrangements rather than competitive deals. This situation 
can be attributed to many problems, such as some stockholders holding the 
overwhelming percentage of overall shares in listed companies and the split share 
structure. Since this kind of property right arrangement is uncompetitive and has nothing 
to do with corporate performance, it is not surprising to find that the current controlling 
shareholders feel no pressure and motivation to improve the corporate governance 
structure. The weakness of the competitive mechanism, as one of the fundamental 
reasons for the inefficiency of China's stock market, leads to imperfect competition and 
rent-seeking activity. For this reason, we can observe this problem happen again and 
again: many enterprises went public first to take up the financial resources and then 
extracted cash from listed companies through tunneling activities. 
B. The market does not have a sound constrained mechanism. 
State-owned controlling shareholders have no motives to bring the talent market 
into full play; conversely, they have more responsibilities and motivations to recommend 
the personnel from related parties to assume the positions of senior executives in listed 
companies, with the purpose of providing direct opportunities to make profit through 
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related party transactions. The lack of a sound constrained mechanism in Chinese stock 
market resulted in the listed companies' principle-agent problem because there is no 
urgent demand for enterprises to improve the internal governance structure. 
C. Given the lack of both competitive and constrained mechanisms, it is not that 
necessary to provide a strong motivation mechanism. 
Under public ownership, it is somewhat inappropriate to have too many incentive 
measures such as the annual salary system, the profit drawing system, the stock option 
system, and so forth. One of the incentive standards deserved to be mentioned is that the 
promotion is a prominent incentive measure with Chinese characteristic. This kind of 
promotion can be accomplished to promote an enterprise's administrator to be a 
government official, crossing the boundary between business and supervisory sectors. 
In conclusion, the development process of China's stock market manifests strong 
Chinese characteristics owing to the government-led evolution system: for one thing, 
China's stock market lacks sound competition, constraints and motivation mechanisms; 
additionally, the business entity shows no pressing demand to improve the internal 
corporate governance structure; moreover, capital market's main function of optimizing 
the distribution of resources to the highest valued use becomes ineffective due to the 
government's policy intervention. Therefore, under the government-led evolution system, 
the future trend favoring the development of a better stock market is to ensure that the 
government withdraws from the stock market to the utmost extent. 
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CHAPTER 3: PERFORMANCE OF THE STOCK MARKETS AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN CHINA 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we will investigate actual performance of the Chinese stock markets, and 
particularly we will investigate the relationship between the stock market development 
and macroeconomic growth. 
To conduct such empirical research, direct application of conventional regression 
techniques is not appropriate since most macroeconomic time series variables are 
generally non-stationary so as to make conventional hypothesis-testing procedures based 
on the t, F , and z 2 test statistic unreliable. In order to avoid the possibility of spurious 
results, our empirical investigation is conducted within the framework of testing for unit 
roots and testing for co-integration in macroeconomic time series, which started gaining 
popularity in the early 1980's. 
To conduct our empirical research, we first test the co-integration relationship 
between performances of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets. We further investigate 
the co-integration relationship between performances of some individual sectors and the 
whole market. Finally, we verify empirically the relationship between the stock market 
development and macroeconomic growth in China. 
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3.2. Performances of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange 
For investigating whether there exists a co-integration relationship between performances 
of the Shanghai stock market and the Shenzhen stock market, the quarterly data of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Composite Index are collected and used for this empirical study. The data set covers the 
period from the first quarter of 1998 to the fourth quarter of 2008. The reason that we 
choose the composite index is that because it is one of the best indexes to reflect the 
overall performances of the markets. Figure 4 below shows these two time series data. 
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Source of data: Adapted from the website of http://stock.sohu .com. The data are the closing 
index at the end of each quarter. 
As pointed early, most macroeconomic time series variables are non-stationary, so 
it is inappropriate to apply the conventional econometric technique to investigate their 
relationships. To avoid the possibility of spurious results, our empirical investigation is 
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conducted within the framework of testing for unit roots and testing for co-integration in 
macroeconomic time series. The unit root test and the co-integration test for two time 
series variables are briefly outlined here. 
Let w
1 
, t = 1,2, ... , T , be a particular time series variable under consideration, 
where Tis the sample size. The series is integrated of order d (denoted by /(d)) if it 
attains stationarity after differencing d times. If the series is I (1) it is deemed to have a 
unit root or it follows a random walk process. This situation arises if its first difference is 
1(0). When two variables are /(1) series, the conventional regression of one variable on 
another is very likely to yield unreliable results. 
One of the most popular unit root tests is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF, 
Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981). The ADF test is performed by testing o0 = 0 against the 
one sided alternative 80 < 0 in the regression: 
p 
~w~ =flo+ fl,t + Oo w1- I + L Y;~wl-i + el , 
i= l 
t = 1,2, ... ,T (1) 
where e1 is the error term and ~ denotes the first-difference operator. Note that equation 
( 1) incorporates both a constant or intercept (flo) and a time trend variable t. If the series 
has a constant term (flo) but no time trend, the term ( fl1t) is omitted from equation (1). 
The optimal lag length ( p) can be determined using one of the lag length selection 
criteria, such as the Schwarz selection criterion. 
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According to Engle and Granger (1987), if two time series p, and q, are both 
non-stationary in levels but stationary in first differences, i.e., both are integrated of order 
1, then there could be a linear combination of p, and q, such that JL, = p, - aq, is 
stationary, i.e., integrated of order 0. The two time series that satisfy this requirement are 
said to be co-integrated, and (1, -a) is called the co-integrating vector. The existence of 
co-integration relationship implies that two time series must be drifting together at 
roughly the same rate, i.e., they are linked in a common long-run equilibrium. To verify 
whether these two variables are co-integrated, we need to perform an Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression of one variable on another, and then perform the unit root test 
on the OLS residual, as Engle and Granger (1987) suggested. If the test result shows that 
the OLS residual is /(0), then two time series are co-integrated; otherwise they are not 
co-integrated. In the following Table, the test results for this investigation are reported. 
Table 1: Results of the ADF Unit Root Tests for the Shanghai and Shenzhen Markets 
Constant only Constant and time trend 
Levels 1st differences Levels 1st Differences 
SH -2.5938 [1] -4.1670*** [0] -2.8465 [1] -4.1283** [0] 
sz -2.9058* [1] -3.6517*** [0] -3.1350 [1] -3 .6112** [0] 
OLS Residual -2.0138 [5] -4.2823*** [4] -2.1396 [5] -4.2529***[4] 
Note: SH and SZ are the Shanghai stock exchange composite index and the Shenzhen stock exchange 
composite index respectively. The OLS residuals are obtained from the linear regression of SH on SZ. 
The computed t statistics for variables in levels and in first differences are presented in the Table. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The numbers in the 
brackets [ ] are the optimal lags selected according to the Schwarz selection criterion. 
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It can be seen from the Table that both the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite 
Index and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite Index are /(1) when both the 
constant term and the time trend are included. When only the constant term is included, 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange Index is still /(1) but the Shenzhen Stock Exchange index 
is I (0) at the 10% significance level. These results indicate that both indexes are non-
stationary. We then perform an OLS regression of the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Composite Index on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite Index, and test the unit 
root of the OLS residual. The result clearly shows that the residual is /(1), which implies 
that the two markets are not co-integrated in their performances. 
Performance of the stock markets is affected by many factors, including 
performance of the real sectors, policies, expectations, the impacts of other stock markets 
in the world, and etc. However, if we look at the long-run performance, the fluctuations 
of the stock index should relate directly and ultimately to the real economic performance. 
To this end, the inexistence of co-integration relationship between two markets should 
reflect the fact that growth of different sectors in the national economy does not share a 
long-run equilibrium path. This imbalanced growth may result from uneven policy 
interventions or may result from the structural changes. 
3.3. Performances of Different Sectors in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Markets 
In this section, we adopt the same methodology to test the co-integration relationship 
between performance of the individual sector and that of the whole market. The result 
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allows us to understand whether each individual sector shares the equilibrium path with 
the whole market. 
According to the availability of the data, the sectors of Industrial, Commercial, 
Real Estate, and Public Utilities are selected for the Shanghai Market while the sectors of 
Financials, Real Estate, Construction, Manufacturing, and Media are selected for the 
Shenzhen Market. The quarterly data are used and the data set for the Shanghai market 
covers the period of the first quarter of 1998 to the fourth quarter of 2008 but the data set 
for the Shenzhen market covers the period from the third quarter of 2001 to the fourth 
quarter of 2008. The data depicts in the following two figures. 
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Source of data: Adapted from the website of http://stock.sohu .com. The data are the closing index at 
the end of each quarter. 
The ADF unit root test is first performed to each sector index. If it is I(l), then it 
is regressed on the relevant Stock Exchange Composite Index to get the OLS residual and 
then the ADF test is performed again to the OLS residual. The results of the tests are 
summarized in Table 2 in the next page. 
For the Shanghai Market, the ADF test results show that all four sector indexes, 
namely Industrials, Commercials, Real Estate, and Public Utilities, are I (0) at the 10% 
significance level when only a constant term is included in the test, but when a time trend 
is also included, the public utilities index is I (0) and all others are I (1) . The unit root 
test on the OLS residuals shows that the OLS residual of Industrial is the only one which 
is I (0) and thus co-integrated with the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index. 
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Table 2: Results of the ADF Unit Root Tests for Different Sectors 
Constant only Constant and time trend 
Levels 151 differences Levels 1st Differences 
Shanghai 
Industrial -2.8 159* [1] -4.0598*** [0] -3.1714 [1] -4.0202** [0] 
(OLS residual) -5.3142***[1] -7.7813*** [0] -5.2705***[1] -7.6658*** [2] 
Commercial -2.7174* [1] -3.4166** [0] -2.9072 [1] -3.3832* [0] 
(OLS residual) -1.7138 [3] -10.703*** [1] -0.9515 [2] -10.684*** [1] 
Real Estate -2.6 148* [1] -4.8247*** [2] -1.6199 [3] -4.8229*** [2] 
(OLS residual) -2.0491 [2] -10.866*** [1] -4.0458***[4] -10.858*** [1] 
Utilities -2.7564* [1] -4.0243*** [3] -3.3377* [1] -3.9478** [3] 
(OLS residual) -2.3836 [0] -7 .5044*** [0] -2.7481 [0] -4.1011 ** [5] 
Shenzhen 
Financials -2.3349 [1] -3.1034** [0] -2.4643 [1] -3.0396 [0] 
(OLS residual) -3 .2929** [0] -4.388 1 *** [4] -4.4269** [0] -4.2625 ** [4] 
Real Estate -2.1304 [1] -3.1443** [0] -2.7934 [1] -3.0900 [0] 
(OLS residual) -1 .8679 [3] -2.6882* [2] -1.1913 [3] -10.530***[1] 
Construction -2.4873 [1] -3 .1356** [0] -2.7679 [1] -3.0790 [0] 
(OLS residual) -1.6588 [0] -5.4083*** [0] -2.1885 [0] -5.3116***[0] 
Manufacturing -2.4804 [1] -2.6652* [0] -3.0120 [1] -2.6131 [0] 
(OLS residual) -2.0250 [0] -6.9273*** [0] -2.7550 [0] -6.9682***[0] 
Media -2.3853 [0] -5.4382*** [0] -2.4048 [1] -5.3367***[0] 
(OLS residual) -2.0323 [1] -9.9238*** [0] -4.6572***[0] -1 0.175***[0] 
Note: The quarterly data of the sector indexes of Industrial, Commercial, Real Estate, and Utilities in 
the Shanghai stock market and the data of the sector indexes of Financials, Real Estate, Construction, 
Manufacturing, and Media in the Shenzhen stock market are available for this test. The OLS residuals 
are obtained from regressions of the sector index on SH and SZ respectively. The computed t statistics 
for variables in levels and in first differences are presented in the Table. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The numbers in the brackets [ ] are the 
optimal lags selected according to the Schwarz selection criterion. 
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The OLS residuals of Commercials, Real Estate, and Public Utilities are all I (1) 
and thus these sector indexes are not co-integrated with the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Composite Index. 
For the Shenzhen Market, the ADF test shows that all series are I (1) at the 
conventional significance levels when only a constant term is included in the test, but 
when a time trend is also included in the test, the index of the Media sector is I(l) but 
others are I(> 1), which means these series may be integrated in order 2 or higher. We 
then conduct the OLS regressions of each sector index on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Composite Index to obtain the residuals and perform the ADF test on these residuals. The 
test results show that the OLS residual of Financials is clearly I(O) no matter the test 
includes only a constant term or includes both a constant and a time trend. Thus, we 
conclude that the Financials sector shares a common equilibrium path with the market 
composite index. The OLS residual of the Media is I(1) when only a constant term is 
included but I (0) when both a constant and a time trend are included. Thus whether the 
Media sector is co-integrated with the whole market is unclear. For all other sectors, 
namely Real Estate, Construction, and Manufacturing, the test results indicate that they 
are all I(l) and thus not co-integrated with the whole market performance. 
3.4. The Impact of the Stock Market Development on Economic Growth 
To investigate the impact of the stock market development on economic growth, a 
multivariate co-integration equation is specified as follows: 
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(2) 
where Y, G, M, and Care real GDP, real government spending, real money supply (M1), 
and real capitalization of stock market. All fJs are co-integration coefficients and e is the 
error term and satisfies the standard assumptions. Following Levine and Zervos ( 1996), 
we also use the market capitalization as a measure of the development of the stock 
markets. It should be noted that Equation (2) can also be viewed as the aggregate demand 
equation, and it determines economic growth assuming that the long-run aggregate 
supply function is given. Using this co-integration equation, we can detect the impact of 
the stock market development on economic growth. The available data set for this 
empirical investigation covers the period from the third quarter of 1995 to the fourth 
quarter of 2008. 
We first test the unit root for each of these variables in Equation (2). If all 
variables in Equation (1) are /(1), we then conduct the maximum likelihood approach of 
testing the number of co-integrating vectors suggested by Johansen (1988) and Johansen 
and Juselius (1990). Theoretically, if there are n variables in the system, it is possible to 
have a maximum of n -1 linearly independent co-integrating vectors. As discussed in 
Dickey et al. (1991), the number of co-integrating vectors can be thought of as 
representing constraints that an economic system imposes on the movement of the 
variables in the system in the long run. As such, more co-integrating vectors imply that 
the system is "more stable" because the system is stationary in many directions. However, 
if the existence of more than one co-integrating vectors is confirmed by the test results, 
we will encounter an identification problem. In such a case, we will have to determine 
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which co-integrating vector represents the true relationship based on the economic 
theories, as suggested by Johansen and Juselius (1994). The estimated co-integrating 
coefficients will allow us to examine the impact of the stock market development on 
economic growth. 
Table 3 below summarizes the ADF unit root test results of these variables in the 
co-integration equation (Equation 2). 
Table 3: Results of the ADF Unit Root Tests for Macroeconomic Variables 
Constant only Constant and time trend 
Levels 1st differences Levels 1st Differences 
GDP -0.5179 [3] -4.0072*** [3] -1.1323 [3] -20.664*** [0] 
G -0.6805 [4] -3.5184** [3] -2.5437 [6] -3.4068* [3] 
M -1.2054 [5] -3 .0558** [4] -1.0954 [5] -3.1945* [4] 
CAP -2.6080 [1] -4.6 144*** [0] -3 .3938* [1] -4.5778*** [0] 
Note: GDP, G, M, and CAP denote, respectively, real GDP, real government spending, real money 
supply (Ml), and real total capitalization of stock markets. The computed t statistics for variables in 
levels and in first differences are presented in the Table. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and I% levels respectively. The numbers in the brackets [ ] are the optimal lags selected 
according to the Schwarz selection criterion. 
According to the test results, all variables in Equation (2) are I (1) when the test 
includes only a constant term. When the test includes also a time trend, the test result 
shows the stock market capitalization is I (0) at the 10% significance level, and all other 
variables are I (1). The Johansen-Juselius multivariate co-integration test is subsequently 
performed and the result is presented in Table 4 in the next page. 
Table 4: Results of the Multivariate Co-integration Test 
5% 
Trace Critical 
Hypothesis Statistic Value 
r:s;3 0.78 3.84 
r:s;2 7.91 15.49 
r:::; 1 23.77 29.79 
r:s;O 69.96 47.85 
Estimated co-integrating coefficients normalized on real GDP 
Real GDP 
1 
G 
-26.2829 
(2.888) *** 
M 
1.7196 
(0.282)*** 
Maximum 5% 
Eigenvalue Critical 
Statistic 
0.78 
7.12 
15.85 
46.19 
Value 
CAP 
0.0728 
(0.102) 
3.84 
14.26 
21.13 
27.58 
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Note: r denotes the number of cointegrating vectors. Critical Values are based on MacKinnon-
Haug-Michelis (1999). The optimal lag length in the co-integration test is selected according to the 
Schwarz selection criterion. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** indicates the 1% level 
of significance. 
The result of the multivariate co-integration shows that at the 5% significance 
level, both the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test suggest the existence of one 
co-integrating vector, which implies that these variables share one long-run equilibrium 
path. The co-integrating coefficients are then normalized based on real GDP. It can be 
seen that the increase in government spending has a negative effect on real GDP while 
increases in money supply and in the stock market capitalization have positive effects on 
real GDP. However, the significance test indicates that the impact of the stock market 
capitalization on real GDP growth is statistically insignificant at all conventional levels. 
It is interesting to note that government spending has a negative impact on real 
GDP growth. One possible explanation to this result is that government spending in 
China has generated strong crowding-out effects on private and local investments and on 
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the next exports through the real interest rate and the real exchange rate channels (see, for 
example, Jinshan Liu (2003) for more discussions). 
3.5 Summary of the Empirical Findings 
From our empirical investigation on the stock market, the data implies that there exists no 
co-integration relationship between performances of the Shanghai stock market and the 
Shenzhen stock market. The inexistence of co-integration relationship should indicate the 
fact that the two markets do not share a common long-run equilibrium path. The 
empirical results also indicate that most of sector indexes are not co-integrated with the 
market composite index, except for the Industrial sector index in the Shanghai stock 
market and the Financials sector index in the Shenzhen stock market. In other words, 
most of individual sectors do not share a long-run equilibrium path with the whole market. 
If our empirical analysis accurately reflects the real economic performance, we can come 
to a conclusion: the growth of different sectors in the national economy and the growth of 
enterprises with different ownership structure (state-owned ones or non-state-owned ones) 
are not balanced. 
From the number of companies listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the 
period from 1991 to 2008 (see Table 5 below), one can find that the Industrial sector saw 
the most rapid rate of increase in the number of companies being listed. Among these 
years, compared to other sectors, the Industrial sector always takes dominant status and at 
year-end 2008, the number of companies listed in the Industrial sector accounts for 63% 
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in total listed companies. The number of listed companies in the sector of public utilities 
has increased rapidly second only to the Industrial sector. As far as the Commercial 
sector is concerned, the number of companies listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange has 
not changed much in recent years owing to the fact that this sector is quickly approaching 
saturation point. For this reason, there are many controls that have been placed on the 
number of companies that have been allowed to list in this sector in the past years. 
Table 5: Distribution by Sector Stocks- Shanghai Stock Exchange 
No. of Listed 
Companies (Year- Total Industrial Commercial Real Estate Utilities 
end) I Sector 
1991 8 3 2 0 0 
1992 29 20 3 1 1 
1993 106 63 14 8 11 
1994 171 93 34 9 15 
1995 188 109 34 9 12 
1996 293 164 46 9 22 
1997 383 218 50 9 33 
1998 438 257 49 9 38 
1999 484 291 49 9 39 
2000 572 347 54 9 50 
2001 646 402 56 13 59 
2002 715 451 60 15 67 
2003 780 505 60 15 72 
2004 837 546 59 17 82 
2005 834 544 58 17 83 
2006 842 544 58 19 88 
2007 860 545 58 24 90 
2008 864 547 58 24 91 
Source of data: Adapted from the {Fact Book 2008~ of Shanghai Stock Exchange: P79. 
As concerns the number of securities listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
during the period from 2002 to 2009 (see Table 6 below), we can see that the 
Manufacturing sector is predominant compared to other sectors and has the fastest growth 
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in the number of securities secured listing. Since the sectors of Construction, Media and 
Financials account for a relatively small number of industries respectively, the number of 
listed securities is correspondingly low. Although the number of securities within the 
Financials sector which have secured listing in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange is low, 
accounting for only 0.8% of all listed securities in 2009, they still occupy an important 
place in the Shenzhen stock market. At year-end 2009, their total market capitalization 
accounts for 4.5% of the Shenzhen market total and their average PIE ratio is 62.23, 11% 
higher than the average for the whole market. 
Table 6: Distribution by Sector Stocks - Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
No. of Listed 
Securities Total Financials 
Real 
Construction Manufacturing Media 
(Year-end) I Estate 
Sector 
2002 551 3 19 8 332 3 
2003 548 3 23 7 325 3 
2004 578 3 27 6 358 3 
2005 586 3 26 6 366 3 
2006 621 3 25 9 391 3 
2007 712 7 30 12 460 3 
2008 782 7 34 12 509 4 
2009 872 7 42 16 563 5 
Source of data: Adapted from the website of Shenzhen Stock Exchange http://www.szse.cn . 
The developing imbalance of Chinese industries can be mainly attributed to the 
structural changes and the government's uneven policy interventions. For one thing, in 
order to foster economic structural transition in different periods, there are corresponding 
preferential policies that provide some specific sectors with much better foundation with 
respect to securing listing. For example, during the period of the Eleventh Five-year Plan 
(2006- 2010), China has been going through a process of economic restructuring and this 
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major background benefits some industries. It is believed that the appreciation of RMB, 
the upgrading of consumption structure, and the industrial upgrading together shape the 
features of China's economy in these five years. These promising sectors include: real 
estate and financials under the condition of the appreciation of RMB; real estate within 
the context of the upgrading of consumption structure and service; manufacturing relating 
to the industrial upgrading. In addition, the measure of asset injection is assumed to be 
favorable to the real estate sector. This view can be proved by the high speed growth in 
the Real Estate sector in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets since 2005 and the 
rapid development of Yanke, the leader of Chinese real estate industry, is an excellent 
example. For another thing, the significance of ownership structure should not be 
underestimated. Given China's supportive policies of promoting the centralization of 
state capital in some sectors, such as the basic industries, the knowledge-based high-tech 
industries and the public utilities industries, it is easier for companies in these sectors to 
meet the requirements for listing than it is for companies in other sectors. For instance, 
the reorganizations and listings of Bengang Steel Plate, Zhangze Electric Power and 
Jiangxi Cement are in conformity with the government's industrial policy. However, it is 
extensively concerned that through listing, state-owned companies receive preferential 
treatment and have better access to financial resources, disproportionately favoring the 
state-owned enterprises at the expense of private ones. 
In Section 3.4, we empirically evaluate the relationship between China's stock 
market development and the long-run economic growth, employing data for the period 
from the third quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 2008. The results suggest that 
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government spending is negatively associated with real GDP while money supply and the 
stock market capitalization is positively correlated to real GDP. However, the 
contribution of the stock market capitalization on real GDP growth is found to be 
statistically insignificant. Therefore, our findings are not consistent with some foreign 
economists' view that stock market development can promote long-run economic growth 
but consistent with the findings of Harris (1997), who finds that the effects of stock 
market development on growth are at best very weak for less developed countries. 
The main reasons for this situation might be as follows. In Chapter 1, I have 
summed up five functions by which a stock market can promote economic performance: 
(1) offering liquidity, (2) mobilizing and pooling savings, (3) generating information 
concerning potential investments and allocation of capital, (4) mitigating the principal-
agent problem, and (5) providing vehicles for trading, pooling and diversifying risks. 
However, in terms of some immature stock markets, such as China's stock market, they 
can hardly exert these functions so as to contribute to enhancing economic growth. 
Specifically, given the very brief history, there are many imperfections in China's stock 
market, for example: stock prices cannot be accurately and timely reflected due to the 
irrational behaviors in stock investment. The uneven policy interventions of the 
government and the unregulated actions of listed companies might also hinder the stock 
market to exert these functions positively. 
To this end, in Chapter 4 we manage to identify some policies that will ease sound 
stock market development. 
56 
CHAPTER 4: THE ROUTE SELECTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
CHINA'S STOCK MARKET AND SUGGESTIONS 
REGARDING CORRECTIVE POLICY CHANGES 
4.1 Debate over the Issue of Whether the Macro-control Policies on Stock Markets 
are Necessary 
The school of thought comprised of economists who are against government's policy 
intervention in the market include: Adam Smith who maintains "laissez-faire" policies, 
David Ricardo, Alfred Marshall, Hayek who developed this thought, and Milton 
Friedman who gave more content to this thought through his "Monetarism". Typically, 
Adam Smith argues that the idealized market society requires little more than a "night-
watchman state", leaving other social and economic activities to the "invisible hand". 
There are similar thoughts in China as well. As early as in 1994, Gong Chen 
called for the government to be "a manager, regulator and a formulator of rules, not a 
direct participant in the market" and opposed the "rescue, boost or suppress" approach of 
the government to the market. Furthermore, Siwei Cheng (2003) argues that the 
government, as the owner of the state assets, should not be responsible for the ups and 
downs of the stock market, not to mention to artificially support or bail out the stock 
market. Only under a rather unique or most necessary condition can the regulators resort 
to appropriate government's policy intervention in the market in accordance with legal 
procedures. Xiaochuan Zhou (2002) also agrees that the market mechanism should be 
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brought into full play in the stock market as deregulation becomes an inevitable trend. It 
is pointed out that a referee should not take part in the game; similarly, the government 
should not intervene in the market. Jinglian Wu (2001) states outright that "Since 1993, 
the authority has supported or bailed out the stock market many times but has not 
produced the desired results. Instead of indeed supporting the stock market, these actions 
contrarily led to share prices' severe volatility, making the government miss many 
opportunities to guide the sound development of the stock market. The policies aimed to 
support the stock market and the SOE reforms must be ended since they only brought 
calamity to the country and the people." 
Nevertheless, as the representative of economic thought of State Interventionism, 
Keynes proposes that the existences of diminishing marginal propensity to consume, 
diminishing marginal efficiency of capital and market liquidity preference together lead 
to insufficient effective demand, unemployment and even economic crisis. The economy 
cannot realize full employment equilibrium only relying on the adjustive function of the 
market mechanism and hence there is a need for the government to intervene directly in 
the market. The Old Institutional Economic school, represented by Commons, and the 
Neo-institutional Economic school, represented by Galbraith, share similar view with the 
Keynesian School that the market mechanism can get back to equilibrium status not 
through self-adjusting but through government's policy intervention. 
Likewise, in China, Zhengqing Zhou (2002) indicates that in order to improve the 
stable development of the stock market, the authority should treat the stock market as one 
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important macro-control target and adjust the irrationally acute fluctuation of stock prices. 
Kequn Lu (2003) also maintains that the authority should try to avoid steep rise and 
decline in prices during the development of the stock market. The government should 
exert necessary and reasonable adjusting control to the stock market since it's a pivotal 
part of the macro economy. 
4.2 Analysis and Evaluation on the Past Macro-control Mode of China's Stock 
Market 
Theoretically, macro-control modes might be classified as follows: the free macro-control 
mode counting on the market mechanism, the macro-control mode with moderate 
government's policy intervention, and the macro-control mode with monopolistic 
government regulation. The macro-control mode completely utilizing the market 
mechanism is suited to the strong-form efficient market 14 and focuses on how to deal 
with crisis properly. In fact, it is hard to find the free macro-control mode since there is 
powerful evidence against the strong-form efficiency. The macro-control mode with 
moderate government's policy intervention is suitable for the semi-strong efficient 
market and emphasizes on establishing a regulatory system. The government supervises 
the activities of stock exchanges against violent fluctuations by imposing restrictions on 
stock prices and scale to some extent, but seldom through administrative measures. This 
mode is widely adopted by emerging market countries and regions, such as: Germany, 
France, Japan, Canada, Australia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea. The macro-control 
14 The efficient-market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are "informationally efficient". 
There are three major versions of the theory: the "weak", "semi-strong", and "strong". 
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mode with monopolistic government regulation is fit to the weak-form efficient market 
and attends to form a stable mechanism of stock market. The authority dominates the 
market operation through severe restrictions on stock scale and prices and employs plenty 
of administrative measures to intervene directly in the stock market, bringing about the 
so-called "policy-oriented market". 
Fundamentally speaking, China's stock market is still an emerging market with a 
structure that is far from a mature market, not to mention the development of China's 
stock market in the early stages. China' s stock market was developed during the system 
transition from a central-planning economy to a market economy and hence assumes the 
characteristic of imposed institutional change. Therefore the past macro-control mode of 
China's stock market was initially established based on the macro-control mode with 
monopolistic government regulation and this mode has had a great influence in some 
respects even up to now. As Carl Walter put it, "the (stock market is) operated by the 
state, regulated by the state, legislated by the state, (and) raises funds for the benefit of 
the state by selling shares in enterprises owned by the state". 
From the emergence of China's stock market to now, the Chinese government has 
boosted and suppressed the market several times. Many sharp ups and downs of the stock 
market can be attributed to government' s policy intervention. Since 1990, the Chinese 
government has adopted a series of important regulations and macro-control measures, 
mainly including: 
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(1) In 1990, the newly established Shenzhen stock exchange was on the brink of 
collapse due to various reasons. The government mobilized financial institutions to 
contribute 200 million RMB to boost the stock market, creating the precedent of the 
Chinese government's bailout policy. 
(2) On 30 July 1994, the SSE composite index declined from around 1340 in 1993 to 
325, signifying the market downturn. The Chinese government employed three macro-
control policies to boost the market: temporary suspension of Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
and new listings in that year, strict scale control over allotment of shares of listed 
companies, and steps taken to ensure funds keep corning into the stock market. These 
policies successfully reversed the market condition and the SSE composite index 
increased more than 200%. 
(3) In the first half of 1999, the SSE composite index once hit the bottom at 1100. At 
that time, the government granted permission to indirectly invest insurance in the stock 
market, carried out the pilot project of securities investment funds, and widened financing 
channels of securities companies. Then China's stock market saw the cross-century great 
bull market after 19 May 1999, and the SSE composite index was brought up to 2245 in 
June 2001. 
(4) During the period when the SSE composite index fell sharply from 2245 on 14 
June 2001 to 1514 on 22 October 2001 , there was extensive discussion among the news 
media concerning the question of whether the government should withdraw from the 
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stock market. However, on 22 October, the State Council and the CSRC announced that 
the reduction of state-owned shares had been called off as part of the macro-control 
policies to boost the market. Moreover, the authority had promulgated 12 favorable 
policies or so-called "12 medals" within the following one month after 22 October 2001. 
(5) When the SSE composite index dropped to 1339 on 29 January 2002, the CSRC 
held a timely symposium to guarantee a stable stock market environment, reassuring the 
public through macro-control measure. 
(6) When the SSE composite index slumped to 1562 on 24 June 2002, the authority 
had announced 3 significantly favorable policies within one day, resulting in the great 
bull market came on 24 June. 
(7) In January 2004, the State Council put forward nine policy suggestions regarding 
the issue that we should go ahead with reform, opening up, stability and development of 
the capital market; but this measure had produced very little effect. On 5 March 2005, 
Premier Wen Jiabao re-emphasized the significance of above nine policy suggestions in 
the government work report at the National People's Congress, especially referring to the 
development of the stock market. Thereby the macro-control policies on China's stock 
market have taken a favorable turn. 
(8) When the SSE composite index declined to 998.23 on 6 June 2005, the 
government had initiated a series of measures to ensure the stability of the stock market 
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and to promote reform. Meanwhile, there was tens of billions of capital bailout plan 
coming from state funds. Consequently China's stock market saw a huge rise of 300 in 
the SSE composite index from year-end 2005 to early 2006. 
(9) At its eighteenth meeting, the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's 
Congress passed the revised Securities Law, or the so-called new Securities Law, which 
took effect from 1 January 2006. The new Securities Law is designed to provide more 
protection for the legitimate rights and interests of investors, especially small and 
medium investors, mainly including: setting up the protection fund of securities investors 
and the mechanism of compensation for investors' loss. Starting from 1 January 2006 
when the new Securities Law came into effect, the SSE composite index had increased 
rapidly from 1180 to 6124 on 16 October 2007, contributing to the greatest bull market 
ever since the establishment of China's stock market. During that period, the SSE 
composite index had not come down considerably except the span when the ministry of 
finance decided to raise the stamp tax from 1 o/oo to 3%o. 
(10) The SSE composite index reached an all-time high at 6124 on 16 October 2007. 
On 17 October 2007, in a series of interviews with domestic and international media at 
the news center of the Seventeenth National Congress, the CSRC vice president, 
Guangshao Tu, said the risk knowledge is essential for investors to raise their risk 
consciousness and ability to guard against financial risks and thus should be the focus of 
current risk education. The SSE composite index declined by 0.92% on the same day, and 
decreased further by 3.5% or by 210 the next day. The following week saw the 
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continuously sharp fall of stock prices, raising the curtain on the corning of bear market. 
Up to 28 March 2008, the SSE composite index struck a new low at 3357, decreased by 
54% compared to 6124. 
(11) In order to increase the demand of stocks and to pump new funds into the stock 
market, the CSRC authorized the issue of new funds every Friday continuously for 8 
weeks from 8 February to 26 March 2008, more than 20 of which are stock funds. 
However, these measures did not achieve good results and the SSE composite index 
continued to fall. 
Looking back on the development course of macro-control policies exerted on 
China's stock market, we can find that the measures employed by the government have 
been getting mature gradually, changing from previously direct administrative 
intervention to presently indirect intervention involved more market means. Judging from 
the effects of the macro-control policies, at present the authority can prevent dramatic ups 
and downs caused by former administrative intervention. The macro-control mode of 
China's stock market is been gradually transformed from the macro-control mode with 
monopolistic government regulation to the one with moderate government's policy 
intervention. Correspondingly, China's stock market is gradually changing from the 
policy-oriented market with administrative characteristics to the one with market 
characteristics. 
64 
4.3 The Reform Orientation of the Macro-control Policies on China's Stock Market 
Should be Transformed from Government-controlled Strategies to Market-oriented 
Ones 
( 1 ) Correct the Role of the Government and Get Rid of Its Profit-oriented Inclination 
The Chinese government mainly plays three roles in the stock market: first, the 
government is the market regulator that governs market behavior, ensuring the smooth 
operation of the stock market; second, the government is the largest shareholder of listed 
companies that manages to control more social capital through the SOE reforms and the 
issue of public shares, ensuring the preservation and appreciation of state assets; third, the 
government is the protector of the interests of investors investing in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). For this reason, as long as one party confronts a problem or 
suffers loss of interest, whether concerning listed companies or investors, the government 
is urged to step in to settle the problem or to protect that party's own interest. This 
resulted in the so-called "reversed transmission of the pressure for easing monetary 
condition", the pressure that listed companies and investors exert on the government to 
increase intervention. Therefore, in order to correct the role of the government and get rid 
of its profit-oriented inclination, the government should make greater efforts to make 
better transaction regulations, to maintain the market order and to protect the interests of 
investors, instead of assuming excessive responsibilities in the stock market. 
Specifically, China's gradual economy reform policies have always been focused 
on the SOE reforms. The policy orientation of "revitalizing state-owned enterprises" can 
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be reflected from everywhere, such as: the financial support in the early 1980s, the 
subsequent credit aid, the support for state-owned share in the early 1990s, and the Split 
Share Structure Reform initiated in 1995. However, on the whole, the performance of 
non-state-owned enterprises is superior to that of state-owned enterprises; and the 
performance of non-state-owned listed companies is clearly better than that of state-
owned listed companies. That is to say, the government's favorable policies on the SOEs 
failed to take effect. In order to actually improve the performance of SOEs, measures 
should be taken to deepen the reform of SOEs in competitive industries, especially the 
reform of the split share structure in state-owned listed companies, and to strengthen 
corporate management. Also, the regulatory protections extended to state-owned firms 
should be weakened, opening them up to tougher enforcement practices, delistings and 
criminal prosecutions. Accordingly, the general reform-orientation should be altered from 
centering on raising funds for the SOE reforms to centering on improving the efficiency 
of optimizing distribution of resources. 
( 2 ) The Multi-level Stock Market Should be Established to Better Fulfill Its Function 
Although grown rapidly in recent years, China's stock market has only main 
board market but without second board market or growth enterprise market until October 
2009. This situation, to some extent, interfered with the proper functioning of the stock 
market for a long time. Many small and medium-scale venture enterprises with promising 
prospects cannot meet the listing requirements of main board stock market due to their 
difficult financial conditions and thereby have limited financing channels which obstruct 
their development. There are considerable advantages to establish the multi-level stock 
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market with growth enterprise market. On one hand, this measure can satisfy all types of 
issuers and investors with different market and risk preferences while diversifying the 
risk by avoiding the problem of unidirectional pricing. On the other hand, the multi-level 
stock market can provide sufficient funds for the development of high-tech enterprises 
and speed up the upgrade of industrial structure. Moreover, the establishment of second 
board market can correspondingly increase listed companies and cut the listing costs by 
decreasing the competition between qualified enterprises. The illegal operations on the 
stock issuance market might also be expected to become less. On 30 October 2009, 28 
stocks had been introduced in the opening of the growth enterprise market. Considering 
that most of outstanding enterprises have been distributed in the eastern coastal areas, we 
may then establish other second board stock market in the central and western areas. By 
doing this, we can expedite the development of central and west regions and narrow the 
gap of the economic development between the eastern and western parts of China. Some 
major cities which possess good financial infrastructure and sufficient human capital, 
such as Chongqing, Chengdu and Wuhan, might be good choices. 
The OTC market should be legalized as part of the multi-level stock market as 
well. It is suggested that when SMEs listed on the OTC market compete with large 
enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, the performance and 
competitiveness of listed companies will get improved through the market mechanism 
instead of through previously administrative controls on M&A. 
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( 3 ) Facilitate Diversification of Portfolios and Investing Tools in the Securities Market 
The financial tools in the securities market can be classified into two categories: 
one refers to basic financial tools, such as stock, bond and fund; the other refers to 
derivative products, such as future, option and forward etc. Most of mature securities 
markets abroad have already developed many derivatives, such as the stock index future 
(SIF), and consequently are capable of smoothing out price fluctuations so that a 
balanced and stable development of a stock market can be realized. In China, due to the 
lack of the short mechanism, investors can make profit only when the stock market goes 
up. The overexuberant investors become the force that drives the market even higher with 
escalating stock indexes, finally incurring the stock market bubbles and a big fall in share 
prices. 
Therefore, developing financial derivative deal and expanding financial derivative 
market are urgent. The development of China's financial derivative market is still in its 
beginning stage, with fewer varieties of derivatives. Especially, as the most important 
hedging tool, the SIF 15 has just been delivered, significantly restraining the development 
of China's securities market for quite a long time. Those innovative financial tools that 
can offer high leverage, low transaction cost, strong liquidity and convenience of 
transaction, such as SIF, executive stock option, future and convertible corporate bond, 
might be considered appropriate. 
15 The latest progress is that the opening ceremony of the SIF was held on 8 April 20 I 0 and that the SIF 
was been placed on the stock market on 16 April 20 I 0. 
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( 4 ) Improve Legal and Regulatory Environment Underpinning the Stock Market and 
Institutionalize the Market Supervision 
Many researchers have suggested that attention must turn towards ensuring that a 
sound legal framework is in place to support the development of an efficient stock market. 
In the study on the relationship between law and stock market development, Levine 
( 1998) points out that the legal system is essential because those enterprises that tend to 
acquire long-term financing resources must convince the investors that they have the 
ability to prevent insiders' opportunistic behaviors. The empirical research from DemirgO 
c-Kunt et al. ( 1996) also reveals that active stock market and effective laws are beneficial 
for enterprises to raise external finance through debt and equity, thereby promoting the 
development of enterprises; and per capita GDP is positively correlated with the 
efficiency of law. Rafael La Porta et al. (1998), after examining a sample of 42 countries, 
demonstrate that enterprise financing structure of different countries varies according to 
the extent that laws can protect the obligatory right and the interests of minority 
shareholder; those countries that cannot provide enough protection for the interests of 
shareholders tend to have less developed stock markets. 
Table 7: The Summary of Laws and Regulations in China's Stock Market 
Classification 
State Laws 
Administrative Laws 
Department Rules 
Self-regulatory Rules 
Source of data: Adapted from the website of www.csrc.gov.cn . 
Quantity 
40 
86 
374 
20 
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The laws and regulations construction m China's stock market have been 
improved by great effort. This tough course of exploration can be reflected from Table 7 
above: there are 520 laws and regulations in total; but there are too many administrative 
laws and department laws compared to state laws (11.5 times). From the contents of laws 
and regulations, we can see that the market subject being protected varies continuously. 
In the Temporary Regulations on Stock Emission and Dealing promulgated by the state 
council on 22 April 1993, Article 4 stipulates that the public ownership should maintain 
its status as the mainstay of the national economy and the preservation and appreciation 
of state assets should be ensured under the condition of stock emission and dealing. In 
fact, this study puts the market players on distinct platforms according to different 
degrees of governmental protections on multi-shareholders. The Securities Law took 
effect on 1 July 1999 does not undergo substantial modification compared to previous 
laws and even imposes restrictions on the stock market participants and the investment. 
Until January 2004 when the State Council put forward nine policy suggestions regarding 
the issue of going ahead with reform, opening up, stability and development of the capital 
market, it is the first time that the government puts the protection of investors' interests in 
the first place. At present, two fundamental securities laws - Company Law and 
Securities Law - are still being revised, showing policies more favorable for market 
orientation. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Summary and Contributions 
With the rapid development of China's stock market, studies in the impact of the stock 
market development on economic growth have stimulated the enthusiasm of many 
researchers. Based on such backgrounds, this research reviews early theoretical 
discussions on the relationship between stock market development and economic growth, 
and briefly presents the development process of China's stock market. Following that, 
using the time series analysis techniques, this study investigates the development and 
performances of the Chinese stock markets and the relationship between China's stock 
market development and economic growth. In conclusion, our empirical results are 
consistent with the theoretical discussions that a policy-oriented stock market is less 
efficient and is, to a certain extent, unlikely to produce a significant and positive effect on 
economic growth. Given that one of the most important barriers to the development of 
China's stock market might be administrative interference of the government, this 
research finally addresses some corrective policy changes 
One of the main contributions of this research is that it has conducted the 
empirical analyses at three levels, which provide a umque perspective m empirical 
studies. First of all, in view of the unequal industrial distribution within the Shanghai 
stock market and the Shenzhen stock market, the inexistence of co-integration 
relationship between the two markets should reflect the fact that growths of different 
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sectors in the national economy do not share a long-run equilibrium path. Furthermore, 
the empirical investigation shows that most of individual sectors do not share a long-run 
equilibrium path with the whole market, except for the Industrial sector in the Shanghai 
stock market and the Financials sector in the Shenzhen stock market. This study has 
provided some explanations to the developing imbalance of Chinese industries and 
concluded that this can be mainly attributed to the structural changes and the 
government's biased policy interventions. In addition, we empirically evaluate the 
relationship between China's stock market development and the long-run economic 
growth. The empirical results indicate that the contribution of the stock market 
capitalization on real GDP growth is found to be statistically insignificant and hence 
there are no obvious relevant relations between stock market development and economic 
growth in China. This finding is consistent with the findings of Harris (1997), who finds 
that the effects of stock market development on growth are at best very weak for less 
developed countries. 
These conclusions have basically reflected the current situation of China's stock 
market development. Given various congenital deficiencies and the very brief history, 
there are many barriers to the development of China's stock market, such as: distortion of 
capital market function, prevailing of speculation, asymmetric information, and 
government's administrative interference etc. These adverse factors prevent the stock 
market to exert those functions by which a stock market can influence economic 
performance in a positive way. This can to some extent explain the result suggested by 
our empirical investigation that the impact of China's stock market development on 
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econorruc growth is limited and hence we cannot impractically over evaluate the 
influence of stock market development at the present stage. 
Among these factors, this research has pointed out that the biggest obstacle to the 
healthy development of the stock market might be government's excessive policy 
intervention. Therefore, this study finally addresses some corrective policy changes. In 
short, the future trends favoring the development of a sound stock market are to 
marketize share issues, introduce multi-level transactions, promote financial innovations, 
improve financial statements and the quality of listed companies, and subsequently 
strengthen the legal framework. 
5.2 Limitations and Future Studies 
For one thing, it is important to point out that the development history of China's stock 
market is barely 20 years, and the high speed period of development, along with the rapid 
increase in the stock market capitalization and the number of listed companies, came only 
after 2000. Accordingly, our empirical analysis is conducted within a comparatively short 
time frame, which implies that our results should be viewed as suggestive findings that 
stimulate further research rather than as conclusive ones. With the constant completion 
and development of the stock market afterwards, future studies based on a longer time 
frame and a larger sample remain to better understand the development and performances 
of the China's stock markets and the relationship between China's stock market 
development and economic growth. 
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For another thing, we cannot ignore the fact that stock markets are only a small 
part of the overall financial markets. More comprehensive studies which combine stock 
market with bond market and foreign exchange market are required to create a better 
understanding of the relationship between securities market development and economic 
growth, and to identify more appropriate policies that will ease sound securities market 
development. 
74 
Appendix: 
Table 8: Data for Empirical Investigation 
Consumer 
Market Shanghai Shenzhen 
Price Index Nominal 
National 
Money 
Capitalization Stock Stock 
GDP 
Government 
(Ml) (A Share+ 
Exchange Exchange 
Year (previous 
(lOOM of 
Expenditure 
(lOOM of 
Composite Component 
corresponding 
RMB) 
(lOOM of 
RMB) 
B Share) Index Index 
period=lOO ) RMB) (100M of (closing (closing 
RMB) ~Zrice) ~Zrice) 
1995 Q3 11 3.2 41 ,502.56 4,074.45 22,500.00 4,091 .36 722.43 I , I64.97 
I995 Q4 110.1 60,793 .73 6,823.72 23,987 .10 3,474.28 555.29 987.75 
1996 Ql 109.8 14,261.22 1,178.64 23,909.00 3,598.85 556.39 I ,OI5 .02 
1996 Q2 108.6 30,861.78 2,901 .69 24,600.00 5,961.9I 804.25 2,059.I3 
1996 Q3 107.4 48,533.06 4,760.07 26,230.00 7,799.36 875.53 2,764.04 
1996 Q4 107.0 71 ,176.59 7,937.55 28,514.80 9,842.39 917.02 3,2I5.83 
1997 Q1 104.0 I6,256.68 I,394.9I 29,058.00 I4,072.23 1,234.62 4,543.00 
1997 Q2 102.8 34,954.3 I 3,512.60 3 I ,074.00 I6,664.7I 1,250.27 5,081.45 
1997 Q3 101.8 54,102.36 5,612.65 32,245 .00 14,922.I4 I ,097.38 3,9I6.96 
1997 Q4 100.4 78,973 .03 9,233.56 34,826.30 17,529.24 1,194.IO 4,I84.84 
1998 QI 100.7 17,501.3I I ,566.49 33, 110.00 I8,679.33 1,243.02 4,063.29 
1998 Q2 98.7 37,222.72 4,008.79 33,776.00 21,412.14 I ,339.20 3,737.14 
1998 Q3 98.5 57,595.24 6,593.52 36,50I .OO 20,452.65 1,242.90 3,283.37 
1998 Q4 99.0 84,402.28 10,798.18 38,953 .70 I9,505.65 1, I46.70 2,949.32 
1999 QI 98 .2 18,789.68 1,840.24 38,054.00 20, I80.12 I ,I58.05 2,872.15 
I999 Q2 97.9 39,554.88 4,648.77 38,822.00 30,099.90 I ,689.43 4,702.77 
I999 Q3 99.2 6I,4I4.22 7,721.99 4I,914.00 29,I26.22 1,570.70 3,967.84 
I999 Q4 99.0 89,677 .05 I3, I87.67 45 ,837.30 26,471.I8 1,366.58 3,369.6I 
2000 Q1 99.8 20,646.96 2,376.43 45, I58.45 36,562.62 1,800.23 4,532.3I 
2000 Q2 100.5 43,748.22 5,838.34 48,024.40 40,690.00 1,928.11 4,830.67 
2000 Q3 IOO.O 68,087.50 9,452.8I 50,6I6.89 4I ,849.30 I,910.16 4,523.66 
2000 Q4 IOI.5 99,214.55 15 ,886.50 53,147.15 48,090.94 2,073.48 4,752.75 
2001 Ql I00.8 23,299.54 2,832.99 53,033 .36 50,908.45 2,112.78 4,965.99 
200I Q2 101.4 48,950.86 7,044.65 55,187.36 53,630.58 2,2I8.03 4,716.90 
200I Q3 99.9 75,818.19 II ,479.63 56,824.00 45,831 .36 1,764.87 3,498.63 
2001 Q4 99.4 109,655 .17 18,902.58 59,871.59 43,522.20 I ,645 .97 3,325.66 
2002 Ql 99.2 25 ,375.69 3,511 .35 59,474.83 43,050.55 I ,603.9I 3,I73.90 
2002 Q2 99.2 53,34I.OI 8,297.36 63,144.00 47,736.46 I,732.76 3,55I.33 
2002 Q3 99.3 83,056.7I I3,497.56 66,799.76 44,243.44 I ,581.62 3,243.93 
2002 Q4 99.6 120,332.69 22,053 .15 70,881.79 38,329.13 1,357.65 2,759.30 
2003 Ql I00.9 28,86I .80 3,892.39 71,438.82 42,729.13 1,5I0.58 3,101.86 
2003 Q2 100.3 59,868.90 9,665.85 75 ,923 .23 41 ,629.53 1,486.02 3,224.81 
2003 Q3 101.1 93,329.30 I5 ,264.89 79,I63.88 39,080.79 I ,367.16 3,054.90 
2003 Q4 103.2 135,822.80 24,649.95 84, 118.57 42,457.72 1,497.04 3,479.80 
75 
2004 Q1 103.0 33,420.60 4,502.00 85,815.57 50,417.42 1,741.62 4,060.14 
2004 Q2 105.0 70,405 .90 10,802.85 88,627.14 40,408.09 1,399. 16 3,275.85 
2004 Q3 105.2 109,967.60 17,144.57 90,439.05 40,928.61 1,396.70 3,453.91 
2004 Q4 102.4 159,878.30 28,486.89 95,970.82 37,055.57 1,266.50 3,067.57 
2005 Q1 102.7 38,763.60 5,209.35 94,743.19 34,802.72 I , 181.24 3,170.35 
2005 Q2 101.6 81,206.80 12,421 .38 98,601.25 31 ,590.01 1,080.94 2,760.23 
2005 Q3 100.9 125,577.50 19,949.94 100,964.00 33,367.60 1,155.61 2,903.11 
2005 Q4 101.6 183,217.40 33,930.28 107,278.76 32,430.28 1,161.06 2,863.61 
2006 Q1 100.8 44,419.80 6,291.65 106,737.08 35,341.74 1,298.30 3,516.40 
2006 Q2 101 .5 93,611.60 14,601.09 112,342.36 44,200.79 1,672.21 4,301.66 
2006 Q3 l 01.5 144,569.60 23,156.95 116,814.10 52,282.79 1,752.42 4,326.78 
2006 Q4 102.8 211,923.50 40,422.73 126,035.13 89,403.89 2,675.47 6,647.14 
2007 Ql 103.3 53,058.29 7,288.75 127,88 1.31 128,033.35 3,183.98 8,549.20 
2007 Q2 104.4 112,458.29 17,9 19.99 135,847.41 166,232.79 3,820.70 12,546.45 
2007 Q3 106.2 174,427.63 29,016.33 142,591.57 253,157.00 5,552.30 18,864.55 
2007 Q4 106.5 257,305.56 49,781.35 152,560.08 327,140.89 5,261.56 17,700.62 
2008 QJ 108.3 63,474.49 9,506.74 150,867.47 226,789.14 3,472.71 13,302.14 
2008 Q2 107.1 134,725.78 22,882.02 154,820.15 178,035.09 2,736.10 9,370.78 
2008 Q3 104.6 208,025.32 36,428.14 155,748.97 148,163.98 2,293.78 7,559.27 
2008 Q4 101.2 300,670.00 62,592.66 166,2 17.13 121 ,366.43 1,820.81 6,485.51 
Source of data: The data of the Consumer Price Index and the Nominal GDP are adapted from the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China. The National Government Expenditure is adapted partly from the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China and partly from the database of China Economic Information. The M1 is adapted from the 
People's Bank of China. The Market Capitalization is adapted from the database of CEIC. The data of the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange Composite Index and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite Index are adapted from the website 
of httg://stock.sohu .com . 
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Table 9: The Shanghai Stock Exchange Industrial Index (Closing Price) 
Year SSE Industrial Index SSE Commercial Index SSE Real Estate Index SSE Utilities Index 
1998 Ql 933.77 1,010.64 1,888.63 1,225.18 
1998 Q2 1,003.78 1,118.66 2,031 .62 1,394.47 
1998 Q3 938.09 1,149.96 1,716.55 1,277.40 
1998 Q4 867 .09 1,014.38 I ,591.18 1,735.72 
1999 Q1 886.06 I ,048.91 I ,508.21 1,707.68 
1999 Q2 1,286.65 1,414.80 2,111.93 2,458.45 
1999 Q3 1,197.76 I ,361.14 1,930.83 2,277.58 
1999 Q4 1,036.75 1,191.43 1,850.41 1,978.66 
2000 Ql 1,359.34 1,763.55 2,100.42 2,415.12 
2000 Q2 1,440.65 1,770.49 2,344.33 2,933.13 
2000 Q3 I ,460.93 1,804.26 2,099.55 2,802.02 
2000 Q4 1,591.03 1,982.82 2,490.88 3,045.66 
2001 Q1 1,633.88 1,987.77 2,503.00 3,187.48 
2001 Q2 1,725.37 2,190.30 2,655.98 3,303.37 
2001 Q3 I ,356.40 I ,753.47 2,297.44 2,674.23 
2001 Q4 1,260.16 1,577.86 2,164.58 2,600.99 
2002 Ql I ,223.94 1,526.47 2,122.55 2,618.62 
2002 Q2 1,328.03 1,624.35 2,254.99 2,820.59 
2002 Q3 1,209.32 1,514.55 2,130.94 2,584.16 
2002 Q4 1,043.55 1,244.50 I ,706.43 2,330.55 
2003 Ql 1,166.47 1,332.69 1,793.13 2,570.83 
2003 Q2 1,148.87 1,197.97 1,636.94 2,598.66 
2003 Q3 1,061.27 1,091 .30 1,431.80 2,418.32 
2003 Q4 1,191.00 997.51 1,263.75 2,776.92 
2004 Q1 1,400.13 1,213.92 1,627.57 3,044.76 
2004 Q2 1,128.90 975.88 1,204.78 2,453.56 
2004 Q3 1,120.62 974.79 1,143.57 2,469.95 
2004 Q4 I ,004.76 918.59 976.51 2,373.16 
2005 Q1 937.43 835.39 936.94 2,234.77 
2005 Q2 829.36 794.65 790.92 2,196.95 
2005 Q3 897.50 901.73 949.55 2,209.08 
2005 Q4 908.63 879.76 995 .27 2,138.03 
2006 Q1 1,026.45 1,052.92 1,265.92 2,168.75 
2006 Q2 1,331.18 1,539.93 I ,258.58 2,692.55 
2006 Q3 1,361 .50 I ,603.43 1,661.91 2,709.39 
2006 Q4 1,850.78 1,801.81 2,574.23 3,850.41 
2007 Q1 2,565.01 2,607.55 3,451.76 5,660.81 
2007 Q2 3,375.28 3,539.38 5,280.33 6,915.02 
2007 Q3 5,064.64 4,518.33 7,382.52 10,328.64 
2007 Q4 4,394.96 4,346.03 6,399.66 10,578.98 
2008 Q1 2,794.02 3,374.62 5,708.13 7,294.58 
2008 Q2 2,224.83 2,652.25 2,918.75 5,269.47 
2008 Q3 
2008 Q4 
1,834.59 
1,465.53 
2,087.04 
1,776.77 
2,46 1.88 
2,266.22 
77 
4,543.95 
3,742.66 
Source of data: Adapted from the website of http://stock.sohu.com . The data are the closing index at the end 
of each quarter. 
Table 10: The Shenzhen Stock Exchange Industrial Index ( Closing Price) 
Year Financials Real Estate Construction Manufacturing Media 
2001 Q3 544.25 524.23 505.19 508.31 571.91 
2001 Q4 516.81 453.48 445.44 476.11 462.02 
2002 Q1 461.39 492.35 453.89 462.44 416.3 1 
2002 Q2 609.61 547.78 495 .19 500.64 443.34 
2002 Q3 568.59 469.36 442.78 458.77 383.02 
2002 Q4 429.38 388.98 363.59 389.08 325.15 
2003 Ql 497 .70 436.69 387.83 422.34 371.38 
2003 Q2 458.58 412.80 331.96 406.61 349.50 
2003 Q3 384.21 369.49 295.45 372.45 321.18 
2003 Q4 357.25 339.63 27 I. 16 384.07 286.80 
2004 Q1 442.13 473.54 332.94 461.30 427.15 
2004 Q2 343.48 360.23 253 .13 353.27 297.88 
2004 Q3 328.39 357.04 248.84 356.05 322.57 
2004 Q4 270.88 332.37 224.92 311.64 308.31 
2005 Q1 210.18 317.57 199.44 295.30 286.60 
2005 Q2 247.48 290.54 195.80 257.25 203 .27 
2005 Q3 239.24 330.73 222.87 277.39 195.49 
2005 Q4 261 .33 360.51 219.44 273.12 181.46 
2006 Q1 277.78 506.48 269.49 320.34 199.47 
2006 Q2 377.60 490.13 409.24 444.31 264.81 
2006 Q3 374.31 626.59 393.72 442.45 294.59 
2006 Q4 612.64 1008.39 438.68 555.21 249.07 
2007 Ql 918.73 1200.91 733 .88 845.34 437.45 
2007 Q2 1220.77 I 930.91 935.82 1094.96 445.40 
2007 Q3 1676.13 28 19.82 1424.85 1555.77 808.28 
2007 Q4 1555.10 2462.82 1261.63 1500.79 688.55 
2008 Ql 908.10 2 I 35.44 859.66 I 135.20 512.56 
2008 Q2 737.52 I 179.83 548.68 828.33 383.94 
2008 Q3 678.38 898.48 407.20 647.67 303.68 
2008 Q4 450.95 887.13 380.84 584.60 323.28 
Source of data: Adapted from the website of http://stock.sohu.com. The data are the closing index 
at the end of each quarter. 
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